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Michael Swack and NoÉmi Giszpenc
Call it “action-discussion.” no, it’s not an oxymoron. It’s the type of work done by the Financial Innova-tions Roundtable, a “think-do tank” housed at the 
Carsey Institute at the University of new hampshire. 
The Financial Innovations Roundtable brings together 
nearly 100 leaders from conventional financial institutions 
such as banks, mortgage companies, insurance companies, 
and investment firms as well as leaders from public agen-
cies, community development financial institutions (CD-
FIs), foundations, pension funds, religious institutions, and 
universities. These participants collaborate on increasing the 
flow of capital and access to financial services in low-income 
communities. 
The group convenes annually to address broad policy is-
sues in the practice of community economic development. 
Members identify the challenges inherent in community de-
velopment and create cross-sector partnerships to develop 
practical solutions. over the course of the year, these partner-
ships engage in various initiatives and research, working to 
remove the barriers between conventional and nontraditional 
lenders, investors, and markets, and to create products and 
services that offer low-income communities greater access to 
capital and financial services. This publication presents sev-
eral innovations that roundtable participants have created or 
are currently developing. 
The first section looks at capital markets and community 
development. “Capital Markets for Community Development 
lenders: Questions and answers,” on page 7, gives an over-
view of the problems faced by CDFIs in accessing traditional 
capital markets. CDFIs generally lack sufficient liquidity 
because once they loan their 
money, they typically cannot 
lend to any new projects before 
being repaid, which is called 
keeping loans “in portfolio.” 
The alternative is to sell them 
to the secondary market or to 
borrow on the basis of assets. 
Some CDFIs do sell to the 
secondary market. one ex-
ample is the mortgage program run by Self-help Ventures 
of north Carolina, described on page 16. a major feature of 
the program is its partnership with Fannie Mae, which has 
agreed to buy the loans and package them into mortgage-
backed securities. Fannie Mae can do this because Self-help 
obtained a grant from the 
Ford Foundation that allows 
it to guarantee the loans, 
covering most of the risk of 
default.
Investing in community 
development can be made 
more attractive by reducing 
risk, as Self-help has done, 
or by reducing the percep-
tion of risk, which can be done by increasing the availability 
of information. to attract a greater number and wider class 
of investors for mortgage-backed securities and other asset-
Community Development Financial  
Innovations Weather the Current Crisis
It would be difficult at this time (Fall of 2008) to ignore the fact 
that the term “financial innovation” has come into great disfavor 
following the collapse of financial markets, in large part due to 
certain kinds of “innovations”, or the lack of understanding or 
abuse of those innovations. Yet it would be a mistake to think 
that all innovation has been bad. Throughout this difficult pe-
riod, we have been contacting various CDFIs and asking about 
the performance of their portfolios. The funds we have talked to, 
including those featured in this publication (e.g., the new hamp-
shire Community loan Fund, Self-help in north Carolina, and 
the Community Reinvestment Fund in Minneapolis, among oth-
ers) are reporting that their portfolios are performing well. Self-
help, for example, which has a large portfolio of single-family 
homes, reports that their defaults are up only about 0.5%. They 
have ample reserves and capital and are doing well. even if the 
economy performs poorly over the next couple of years, and their 
defaults increase due to macroeconomic factors (such as higher 
unemployment among borrowers), they are well positioned to 
weather the storm. In stark contrast to many subprime lenders, 
CDFIs relied on meticulous underwriting, carefully qualifying 
people based on real incomes, homeowner training, required 
down payments, understanding local markets and more. In new 
hampshire, defaults in the Manufactured housing Coops (see 
article, p. 22) are very low, and the coops themselves are cur-
rent in their payments to the loan Fund. It is important to note 
that large players in the financial markets such as Fannie Mae 
and the ratings agency of Standard and Poor’s, both described in 
various articles in this publication, approached the community 
development sector very carefully, performed due diligence and, 
in fact, contributed to the successful initiatives described in this 
publication. 
Over the course of the year, these partnerships 
engage in various initiatives and research, work-
ing to remove the barriers between conventional 
and nontraditional lenders, investors, and mar-
kets, and to create products and services that offer 
low-income communities greater access to capital 
and financial services.
8backed securities from community development lenders, the 
Financial Innovations Roundtable has obtained a public rat-
ing for an asset-backed security (see “Creating the First Rated 
Pool of Securities Backed by Community Development as-
sets,” p. 11). The Community Reinvestment Fund issued a rat-
ed asset-backed security in 2004, which allowed stakeholders 
(foundations, for example) to buy more than they could when 
the assets were unrated and new players (insurance compa-
nies, mutual funds, banks) to buy for the first time. Replicat-
ing this model can make unlimited funds available to com-
munity development lenders.
Providing insurance for transactions both reduces risk and 
provides information, attracting more investors. “The Com-
munity Development assurance Company” on page 18 de-
scribes how Financial Innovations Roundtable members have 
designed a company that can sell insurance to CDFIs on their 
transactions (such as selling their loans to the secondary mar-
kets). having an insurance policy on the transaction reduces 
risk and therefore increases demand and improves terms 
for the transactions. The insurance company itself would be 
publicly rated, giving investors a clear picture of its financial 
strength and activities. 
lack of volume prevents many CDFIs from taking advan-
tage of another source of funds, commercial paper. Many 
companies use these short-term loans, which are typically 
rolled over at maturity. Borrowing against their assets instead 
of selling their loans would be another way for CDFIs to ob-
tain liquidity. Financial Innovations Roundtable members 
have designed a Commercial Paper Co-op that would aggre-
gate the short-term borrowing needs of its CDFI members 
and present their assets in a framework understandable by 
ratings agencies (see “The Commercial Paper Co-op,” p. 22). 
a second section of this report tackles the issue of Mission-
related Investing and Targeted Investing. Most foundations 
place their endowment in traditional investments that will 
preserve the principal and generate ongoing dividends. Many 
worthwhile community development projects also generate 
returns, albeit not all at market rates. Some foundations and 
public pension funds have diversified their investment port-
folio to include more mission-related projects. This section 
of the report examines the mission-related investing projects 
of the F.B. heron Foundation and the targeted investments 
of CalPeRS, the California Public employees Retirement Sys-
tem (see pp. 27 and 32, respectively).
The heron Foundation has developed a tool called the 
“Mission-related Investment Continuum” that allows it to 
examine investment opportunities in different asset classes 
within a framework of a set asset-allocation policy. Its staff 
can find, investigate, and promote investment opportuni-
ties for review by investment managers. The foundation is 
eager to share its lessons with other foundations and insti-
tutional investors.
to overcome the challenge of being unable to make below-
market investments, CalPeRS has chosen to put some funds 
into investments that meet certain geographic and diversity 
criteria while maintaining the high standards for return re-
quired of all investments. These investments have proved 
quite successful both as revenue generators (their primary 
purpose) and as sources of benefit to the community. 
a third section of the report examines a work in progress, 
Resident Owned Communities USA. Building on the success 
of the new hampshire Community loan Fund’s (nhClF) 
Manufactured housing Initiative, which has enabled the resi-
dents of 80 mobile home parks to purchase the land on which 
they live and run the parks themselves as cooperatives, RoC 
USa plans to take resident-ownership to scale by training 
practitioners, sourcing senior debt, and leveraging subordi-
nate debt through credit enhancements (see “Manufactured 
home Communities – ROC USa, p. 38). Participants of the 
Financial Innovations Roundtable are helping nhClF ana-
lyze the process and launch ROC USa nationally. 
9Community development financial institutions (CD-FIs) have grown significantly in size and scope in the past quarter century. after decades of lending where 
others were often reluctant to lend, many CDFIs have demon-
strated a solid capability to manage risk in their markets and 
have developed strong portfolios. as they continue to expand 
to meet the ever-increasing housing, business, and facility de-
mands of their communities, their funding needs are growing. 
at the same time, the traditional sources of community devel-
opment capital, such as government and foundation funding, 
are diminishing, and many community development lenders 
are looking for new strategies and techniques to raise mon-
ey. Some have turned their attention to conventional capital 
markets. Can this be done? If so, how? Is it a good idea? This 
article addresses a few of these questions. 
What are community development financial 
institutions? 
CDFIs are financial institutions that are committed to meeting 
the credit needs of low-income individuals and communities. 
typically, CDFIs are either community-based nonprofit or-
ganizations or national intermediaries with local community 
offices. They are sensitive to the community’s financial needs, 
understand the local market, and are willing to invest the 
time and resources needed to find and cultivate sound lend-
ing opportunities in these neighborhoods. as such, they are 
able to develop loan and investment products that differ from 
conventional lenders’ offerings, providing funding where tra-
ditional lenders may not. 
Community development loan funds, community devel-
opment credit unions, community development corpora-
tion loan funds, microenterprise funds, and community de-
velopment banks are all considered CDFIs. all of these are 
private, nonprofit corporations, with the exception of com-
munity development banks, which are private, for-profit 
entities that have a community development purpose.1
Most CDFIs have been created since 1980, and most re-
main small by conventional standards. however, the CDFI 
industry has begun to scale up. The CDFI Data Project, a 
foundation-funded initiative, collects industry-wide data on 
CDFIs.2 as of the end of 2006, about 1,000 CDFIs were op-
erating in the United States. The Data Project collected data 
from 505 CDFIs in 2006. Collectively the 505 controlled $15.1 
billion in outstanding financing and financed around 70,000 
units of affordable housing in 2006. The CDFIs’ net loan loss-
es in 2006 were less than one-half of one percent of their out-
standing loans (matching the rate of conventional financial 
institutions), and they had sufficient reserves and equity bases 
to cover those losses. 
Where do CDFIs get their funds, and how do they 
operate? 
CDFIs are generally financed through a mix of public and pri-
vate funds that include loans, grants, and investments. Their 
growth has accelerated since 1995 owing in large part to the 
creation of the CDFI Fund, a program within the U.S. Depart-
ment of treasury. The CDFI Fund was established in 1994 to 
support CDFIs and to make capital available to CDFIs serving 
underserved communities and individuals. The CDFI Fund 
is the largest source of funding for CDFIs, providing since its 
inception more than $860 million in awards to community 
development financial institutions (see www.cdfifund.gov). 
CDFIs lend this money to the communities in which they 
work and typically oversee every aspect of the loan. Most CD-
FIs review applications, originate loans, book the loans, ser-
vice them, and hold them in their portfolios until the loans 
are completely repaid. This type of top to bottom (vertically 
integrated) lending is known as portfolio lending. 
How is this type of lending different from what 
conventional banks do? 
In the 1970s and 1980s, banks began packaging and selling 
their residential mortgage loans to a secondary market in a 
process known as securitization. Banks no longer had to fund 
each loan through their deposits. Instead, they could sell their 
loans to investors and use the revenue to fund more loans. 
The birth of securitization allowed banks to originate more 
loans, generate more revenue on the fees from the origina-
Capital Markets for Community Development 
lenders: Questions and answers
Michael Swack, Carsey Institute, University of New Hampshire
CDFIs are able to develop loan and investment 
products that differ from conventional lenders’ 
offerings, providing funding where traditional lend-
ers may not.
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tions, and sell off their risk of holding fixed-rate loans in their 
portfolios.3 The process of originating loans and selling them, 
called capital markets lending, is now the standard for banks. 
today, securitization accounts for trillions of dollars of trans-
actions and involves mortgage finance companies and other 
specialty finance companies as well as banks.4 
What exactly are capital markets? 
Capital markets are markets where individuals, governments, 
and businesses trade money. Those with excess funds transfer 
capital to those who need it. In return, the investors expect 
a rate of return on their money that is consistent with the 
amount of risk they are taking. Capital markets allow large 
amounts of money to be pooled, while giving individual in-
vestors an opportunity to diversify their risk. The stock and 
bond markets are two of the major capital markets. 
What is the difference between primary and 
secondary capital markets? 
The primary market is where new securities are issued. a cor-
poration or government agency that needs funds issues these 
rights of ownership, interest, or dividends to willing buyers, 
most often in the form of stock or bonds. The securities are 
usually underwritten by investment banks, which guarantee 
a minimum price to the seller for the security. These banks 
then sell the securities to the public in the secondary capital 
market. Secondary markets are where securities are traded. 
The vast majority of financial transactions that occur through 
stock exchanges, bond markets, futures markets, or other 
mechanisms all happen in the secondary market. 
Can you give an example of how this works? 
Consider the residential mortgage system in the United 
States. This system is made up of a primary market and a 
secondary market. In the primary mortgage market, banks 
provide funds directly to the new homeowner, who in turn 
issues a security, the mortgage, to the bank. The second-
ary market is where this mortgage loan is bought and sold 
by investors. The bank that made the loan in the primary 
market wants to sell the mortgage and use the money to 
originate more loans. Because the mortgage is backed by 
the homeowner’s real estate, it is an attractive security for 
investors. In most cases, one of the two largest second-
ary mortgage market institutions—the Federal national 
Mortgage association (Fannie Mae) or the Federal home 
loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)—will buy the 
mortgage from the bank. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ag-
gregate single- and multifamily housing loans into pools, 
and with the pools of mortgages and ultimately the real 
estate serving as collateral, they create mortgage-backed 
securities. (an asset-backed security is a security backed by 
assets that can include real estate and other assets.) to fi-
nance their future purchases, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
sell these mortgage-backed securities to public investors 
at a fixed rate of return, maintaining the credit risk of these 
loans on their own books. 
So, investors around the country are trading my 
mortgage with my local bank? 
Yes. The idea behind this secondary market is that while home 
loans are local loans, the system of finance for them need not 
be. national capital markets provide funds for local housing 
markets. with the proceeds from the sale of their mortgages, 
primary lenders replenish their money supply and use it to 
make more loans. without this secondary market, primary 
lenders would be forced to keep all their loans in their port-
folios. They could make loans only from the money they had 
in deposits, restricting their ability to serve the needs of new 
homeowners. 
What’s the deal with the subprime mortgage 
crisis?
Subprime mortgages were the source of the recent financial cri-
sis. Does that mean securitization is a bad idea? what is the differ-
ence between subprime mortgages and CDFI lending? 
Much of the blame for the subprime lending crisis lies with 
mortgage originators (lenders). It was the lenders (often mort-
gage brokers who may or may not have worked for a particular 
bank) who ultimately lent funds to people with poor credit and a 
high risk of default. Many of these originators used unscrupulous 
methods to encourage people to borrow money they could not 
afford to repay, particularly when the original interest rate on an 
adjustable rate mortgage reset to a higher rate after a few years. 
often the originator did not care whether a borrower could repay 
the loan because the broker would earn a fee on the origination 
regardless and would have no responsibility for the repayment of 
the loan. The loans would then be sold and bundled into secu-
rities. Bundles of these high-risk loans were sold to investors as 
highly rated investments even though the underlying mortgages 
were very risky. 
CDFIs underwrite their loans to a much higher standard. They 
carefully assess what each borrower can afford and establish rates 
and terms that match the borrowers’ needs. loans underwritten 
by CDFIs have served lower-income people well and have experi-
enced much lower losses during this period.
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Aren’t CDCs and CDFIs already involved in these 
primary and secondary capital markets? 
Yes, in a limited way they are. CDFIs are primary market 
lenders. They receive money from foundations and govern-
ment agencies and lend it to individuals and communities 
that need funds. 
That seems to work in my community, so what’s 
the problem? 
The problem is that foundations and government have lim-
ited funds to meet the demand for capital in your community. 
People want to buy homes and start businesses. organiza-
tions want to develop housing and community facilities. CD-
FIs are mostly portfolio lenders. although they have become 
good at assessing risk and managing healthy portfolios, they 
are limited by the amount of money they receive in grants and 
donations. They cannot meet all their lending needs. Many 
CDFIs could expand their lending and better serve their com-
munities if they complemented their portfolio lending with 
some capital markets lending. after all, there is a lot of money 
out there in the capital markets—and communities could use 
it. a CDFI involved in capital markets lending would em-
ploy methods, such as securitization, that would distribute its 
loans among a range of investors, instead of holding all of the 
loans in its portfolio. By selling their loans on the secondary 
market, CDFIs can increase their liquidity. 
We want Wall Street to buy our loans. What’s the 
hitch? Do we have to discount our loans? 
not necessarily. Investors will want to pay less than the face 
value of a loan if they think the loan will not perform. But 
CDFI loans perform and yield good returns. CDFIs simply 
have to demonstrate this success in a way that investors will 
understand. 
How can CDFIs demonstrate success? 
First, the CDFI industry needs to change some collective 
behaviors in order to access these markets. In general, here’s 
what the capital markets are looking for: 
 Performance Data 
 Capital markets like a lot of information and data. 
Investors want to know how CDFIs perform over 
time. what are the rates of delinquency, default, and 
recovery? Currently, most CDFIs have weaker standards 
of data collection and measurement than these markets 
want, and they often have different definitions of what 
constitutes a delinquency or default. to show the strength 
of their loans, CDFIs must illustrate performance using 
standard industry data and definitions. 
 Standardization 
 This is a big one. Capital markets like vanilla. not 
caramel, not strawberry, not chocolate. Investors want 
CDFIs to standardize things within the industry so they 
can better understand the products and appropriately 
assess risk. The capital markets want not only standard 
data collection but standardized performance tracking 
tools; uniform ways of servicing, underwriting, 
and assessing risk; and a set method of collection. 
 The CDFI industry does not currently have any 
specific standards for these practices. however, trade 
associations of CDFIs are becoming larger and more 
sophisticated and have begun to promote operating 
practices among their members that enhance the 
industry’s ability to meet the capital markets’ standards. 
For example, the opportunity Finance network has 
developed a CDFI assessment and Rating System 
(CaRS™) that analyzes and rates CDFIs on their impact 
(effective use of their financial resources to achieve their 
stated mission) and financial strength and performance 
(overall credit-worthiness based on past financial 
performance, current financial strength, and apparent 
risk factors). It is the first step toward standardizing 
CDFI processes and procedures. 
 Volume 
 Capital markets like to deal with big numbers. They want 
pools of loans that are $50 million or more in value. By 
comparison, CDFIs deal in very small numbers. Some 
CDFIs are developing mechanisms for pooling their 
loans to offer investors the big numbers they desire. 
 Pricing 
 The capital markets need products that are priced 
properly relative to risk and offer an attractive return. 
not all CDFI products can meet the pricing criteria, 
but many can and do. CDFIs must identify and market 
these products. 
Many CDFIs could expand their lending and better 
serve their communities if they complemented their 
portfolio lending with some capital markets lend-
ing  By selling their loans on the secondary market, 
CDFIs can increase their liquidity. 
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 Credit Enhancements 
 to make CDFI products more attractive, investors 
may want certain credit enhancements. Credit 
enhancements, such as insurance or letters of credit (an 
irrevocable commitment by a bank to pay), make loans 
less risky to investors by guaranteeing regular payments. 
CDFIs could leverage some of their government and 
foundation money as credit enhancements in, perhaps, 
a better use of these funds. (See p. 18 on the Community 
Development assurance company, which will provide 
insurance for CDFI transactions.)
What are the barriers to entering capital markets? 
The first barrier is volume. to achieve larger volume, CDFIs 
can and have created cooperatives in which CDFIs pool their 
loans and sell them to an institutional investor similar to Fan-
nie Mae. By enticing an investor with large volume and low 
risk resulting from the geographic dispersion of the loans, 
pooling can be a cost-effective way for smaller CDFIs to in-
crease their liquidity.5 
The second barrier is credit enhancements. a common tool 
used to promote the sale of loans is financial guarantee insur-
ance. This insurance ensures that payments are made to inves-
tors who buy pools of loans. CDFIs could negotiate a finan-
cial guarantee through an established insurance company and 
provide a credit enhancement on a pool of community devel-
opment loans. The enhancement would help the pool achieve 
a good rating from one of the rating agencies, which would 
signal that the pool was a sound investment.6 The favorably 
rated security could then more easily be sold in the financial 
markets, where many insurance companies and mutual funds 
buy only highly rated securities. 
Won’t banks and lenders lose the close working 
relationships they have cultivated with borrowers 
when they sell the loans? 
not at all. In most instances, lenders will continue to directly 
service their own loans. They will need to maintain a close 
relationship with borrowers, providing them technical assis-
tance and monitoring their performance to ensure a healthy 
return to investors. 
Will CDFIs have to adjust their portfolio to meet 
the specific “appetite” of the market, as opposed to 
the needs of the borrowers and communities they 
currently serve? 
not necessarily. Many CDFIs will continue to do portfolio 
lending even if they are able to sell some of their loans. That 
is, they will still have loans that meet certain unique needs or 
circumstances and require the CDFI to service and hold the 
loan to maturity. In fact, a CDFI might have many of these. 
But, many community development lenders have developed 
certain prepackaged loan products, such as housing or facility 
loans. These loans are underwritten in a consistent way and 
are “standard” within the CDFI’s own portfolio. These are the 
types of loans that would best be packaged and sold to inves-
tors in the capital markets. 
Will institutional investors really buy CDFI loans? 
Has anyone actually done anything yet? 
Yes, it can work, and it has. For example, both the Community 
Reinvestment Fund (CRF) of Minneapolis, Minnesota, and 
Self-help of Durham, north Carolina, have successfully ac-
cessed capital markets and are providing increased liquidity to 
the community development field (see pp. 11 and 16, respec-
tively). to attract institutional investors, CRF began pooling 
and underwriting loans that had been originated by a range 
of smaller community development lenders around the coun-
try. They have amassed more than $700 million worth of loans 
and sold them to the secondary markets, bringing in capital 
for these small lenders. Self-help developed and marketed a 
standard home mortgage product to attract investors and has 
underwritten more than $4.5 billion in these mortgages for 
low-income communities. Both organizations’ efforts have at-
tracted a number of institutional investors to these commu-
nity development projects, including Prudential Securities, 
Metlife, and equitable Insurance. 
Where can I find additional information? 
This publication details a number of current and future inno-
vations to help CDFIs access capital markets developed by the 
Financial Innovations Roundtable. to learn more, visit http://
www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu/fir.html. 
1 See http://www.ncif.org/index.php/CDBIindustry/CDBIs/ for more on 
Community Development Banking Institutions.
2 See http://www.opportunityfinance.net/industry/industry_sub2.
aspx?id=236 for more on the CDFI Data Project and to access publications 
based on its research.
3 Securitization protects banks from interest rate volatility, reducing risk. 
Before securitization, banks would make a loan at 6% for 30 years. Several 
years later, they might suffer a loss, paying their depositors more than 6% if 
interest rates went up.
4 kirsten Moy and alan okagaki, “Changing Capital Markets and Their Im-
plications for Community Development Finance” (washington, DC: Brook-
ings Institution, 2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2001/
07metropolitanpolicy_moy.aspx.
5 See Gregory Stanton, “Unblocking obstacles to Capital Markets for Com-
munity Development lenders” (Manchester, nh: Community economic 
Development Press, School of Community economic Development, South-
ern new hampshire University, 2003). For reprints contact arc@snhu.edu 




Since 1994 when Congress directed the Department of treasury to create the Community Development Fi-nancial Institutions Fund, Community Development 
Financial Institutions (CDFIs) have become more prominent 
players in community development lending. CDFIs are com-
mitted to meeting the credit needs of low-income individuals 
and communities. They are sensitive to local needs and they 
are able to develop loan and investment products that differ 
from conventional loan products. CDFIs are also sophisticat-
ed in their approach to meeting credit needs and providing 
assistance to borrowers, both organizational and individual. 
There are different types of CDFIs, but they all share a 
commitment to providing credit and technical assistance 
to unconventional borrowers (that is, low-income individu-
als and community-based development organizations) 
and filling capital gaps that conventional lenders do not or 
cannot fill (see box). 
The success of CDFIs may stem from special expertise in 
management and underwriting (analyzing the credit-wor-
thiness of borrowers, that is, their ability to repay a given 
loan, and the suitability of the loan’s purpose), the greater 
time CDFIs spend on project management, and the smaller 
number of projects they handle relative to conventional 
lenders.2 
Information Asymmetry
Conventional lenders may hesitate to enter the market 
for low-income individuals and communities because the 
lenders lack sufficient information or expertise to exploit 
the opportunities to earn a profit. In other words, they are 
suffering from “information asymmetry”: they know less 
than other players in the marketplace, such as potential bor-
rowers, about their likelihood of repayment.3 Unlike conven-
tional lenders, CDFIs know much more about low-income 
individuals and communities, which allows them to operate 
more successfully.
Conventional capital markets often lack information on 
CDFIs also. CDFIs are generally small institutions that often 
customize their products for their borrowers. Counter to the 
trend in conventional finance, CDFIs are more often vertical-
ly integrated, carrying out most functions internally (for ex-
ample, loan origination, servicing, and technical assistance). 
Such a structure helps CDFIs maintain close contact with 
their customers, but this operating model also creates higher 
“transaction costs” (costs involved in the process of making 
and monitoring a loan) and less efficiency.4 Moreover, CDFI 
underwriting standards and loan documents are frequently 
nonstandardized. 
The lack of standardized performance data in community 
development lending perpetuates the perception that com-
Creating the First Rated Pool of Securities Backed by 
Community Development assets
Michael Swack, Carsey Institute, University of New Hampshire  
The Special Role of CDFI Lending
The following are types of activities, including lending, 
that 
CDFIs offer in low-income communities:1
1. Predevelopment financing in the early stages of a project, 
which allows the project to reach the stage where it is bankable;
2. Junior financing (subordinate debt that has a right to the bor-
rower’s assets only after senior debts have been paid), which 
cushions conventional loans above certain loan-to-value ratios 
(for example, loans over 75% loan-to-value ratio);
3. Seasoning loans (holding them for a certain length of time) to 
demonstrate their safety so conventional institutions can later 
purchase or refinance them; 
4. Demonstrating the effectiveness of new lending approaches, 
underwriting methods and loan products so that conventional 
institutions can become comfortable with the new approaches 
and products;
5. high transaction cost loans: loans that are too small or compli-
cated and thus cost too much because of the time involved;
6. loans that allow community development organizations or 
entrepreneurs to gain experience and a track record so they 
can use conventional lenders in the future; and, 
7. high-risk loans in general, for reasons such as lack of organi-
zational financial strength, lack of take-out financing, difficult 
neighborhood, scattered sites, or a nontraditional income 
stream.
Customized loans with differing underwriting 
standards and insufficient information about the 
field make it difficult for the community develop-
ment field to engage in securitization.
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munity development loans are risky.5 For any emerging asset 
class, such as community development loans, to gain cred-
ibility in the capital markets, it must have five years of reliable 
performance data.6 This allows investors to assess risk over 
time. The CDFI field has no large body of data that is uni-
formly collected and highly reliable. 
Customized loans with differing underwriting standards 
and insufficient information about the field make it difficult 
for the community development field to engage in securitiza-
tion, the process of packaging a pool of similar financial in-
struments into a new instrument that can be sold to investors 
(see previous article, p. 7).
The Community Reinvestment Fund: A Rated 
Securitization Model7
The Financial Innovations Roundtable has increased knowl-
edge about community development lending by catalyzing a 
public rating for an asset-backed security transaction of pooled 
community development loans. The roundtable brought to-
gether a loan aggregator (the Community Reinvestment Fund 
of Minneapolis), a wall Street ratings agency (Standard and 
Poor’s), capital markets specialists (wall Street without walls 
volunteer financial experts), private foundations (Fannie Mae 
and heron Foundations) and other financial professionals to 
accomplish this goal. The first transaction, described below, 
closed in november 2004. 
Community Reinvestment Fund (CRF) is a Minneapolis-
based 501(c) 3 corporation that began operations in 1988 
and provides new loan capital for community-based devel-
opment organizations by creating a secondary market for 
community development loans. These development loans 
are distinguished from traditional commercial loans in that, 
in addition to financial objectives, they emphasize social 
objectives such as job creation, affordable housing, and 
community revitalization in economically distressed com-
munities or among economically or socially disadvantaged 
groups.
CRF purchases loans, sells loans it has purchased to spe-
cial purpose entities (SPes), facilitates the issuance of as-
set-backed securities supported by the loans owned by the 
SPes, services the loans it has sold to the SPes, and manages 
new Markets tax Credits entities on behalf of investors.
Prior to 2004, CRF successfully issued 16 series of its 
Community Reinvestment Fund Revenue Bond and Note 
Program with a total par (face or nominal) volume of more 
than $300 million. In addition, CRF released a $74.6 million 
affordable housing note issue in 2001. CRF never submitted 
any of these transactions for a public or private rating. 
CRF conducts extensive credit reviews and analyses on 
the loan originators and each loan. Their diligence is re-
flected in the performance of these loan pools, which has 
exceeded general expectations. to date CRF loan portfolios 
have experienced a cumulative loan default rate of 0.57%. 
Combining its mission and this financing experience, 
CRF has a proven ability to analyze loan originators and 
project accurate loss expectations. Socially responsible 
institutional investors have expressed their confidence in 
CRF’s capabilities by purchasing CRF’s asset-backed secu-
ritizations. In fact, many of CRF’s institutional investors hit 
their limit on the maximum exposure to nonrated com-
munity development loan-backed securities held in their 
respective portfolios.
A New Approach and the First Rated Community 
Development Securitization
During a Financial Innovations Roundtable meeting in 
early 2002, a consensus of attendees suggested that the 
best way to demonstrate the marketability and underlying 
credit quality of selected community development loans 
was to assist an existing aggregator in underwriting the 
first rated asset-backed securitization supported by a pool 
of community development loans. to increase the mar-
ketability of this security, the original plans also called for 
purchasing financial guaranty insurance on the issue as a 
credit enhancement (for reasons described below, this did 
not take place). 
The structure of this rated issue would serve as a tem-
plate or model for future transactions. a rated security 
would also attract new investor classes, thereby creating an 
unlimited flow of new capital into the community develop-
ment sector. likewise, current socially responsible investors 
in this asset type would no longer be constrained by inter-
nal or external caps imposed on unrated securities. 
to expedite the selection of a potential issuer, roundta-
ble participants chose to identify an existing loan aggrega-
tor with the operating experience and the support of an 
existing team of financial intermediaries, including bond 
attorneys, investment bankers, quantitative financial ana-
lysts, and others. CRF met these qualifications and agreed 
to work with wall Street without walls.
 “CRF-17” Transaction Overview 
The CRF issued the CRF USA Community Reinvestment Rev-
enue Notes, Series 17 as part of its ongoing mission to create a 
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secondary market for selected community development and 
affordable housing loans, allowing loan originators to reinvest 
the proceeds of selling loans back into their respective com-
munities. CRF sells these loans to an issuer—a bankruptcy-
remote, special purpose entity—that in turn issues the notes, 
secured by the purchased loans. 
The CRF-17 issue was priced in october 2004. The accom-
panying term sheet provides an overview of the transaction.
Foundation Support
The Fannie Mae Foundation was committed to improving 
access to capital markets for community development loan 
originators. The foundation provided financial support to the 
Financial Innovations Roundtable and to wall Street without 
walls, including their assistance to CRF. The foundation rec-
ognized that the successful sale of the CRF transaction was 
an essential first step in facilitating new flows of capital into 
the community development and affordable housing sectors. 
Foundation support facilitated the CRF transaction in several 
important ways, including injecting the needed capital and 
information.
Capital was necessary because CRF-17 was almost three 
times the size of the CRF program’s largest previous transac-
tion. Given that loan originators cannot always wait to sell 
their loans at closing, CRF maintains a bank line of credit to 
purchase and “warehouse” loans until closing. however, the 
size of its credit facility was insufficient to satisfy the number 
of loan purchases that were projected for CRF-17. CRF’s bank 
was willing to increase its warehouse line if CRF could raise 
additional capital. The Fannie Mae Foundation and the F.B. 
heron Foundation lent the necessary funds to CRF. CRF re-
paid this loan early. 
although CRF’s historical loan performance (defaults, 
losses, and recoveries) was impressive for the commercial 
banking industry, Standard and Poor’s considered it too 
limited. another representative source was required. FIR 
selected the Small Business administration’s Section 504 
Certified Development Company loan Program as the al-
ternative information source because its credit underwrit-
ing criteria closely resembled those of CRF and the CRF-17 
loan portfolio. FIR used foundation funds to purchase data 
from the SBa loan program and performed the first “exter-
nal” analysis of it. The comprehensive analysis of this $13.9 
billion (and 39,139 loan) program proved to be an accept-
able benchmark for Standard and Poor’s. The program pro-
vided invaluable data on loan defaults, losses, recoveries 
and prepayments, which were projected into the CRF-17 
cash flows. 
table 3: loan Pool 
 Number of Loans 123
 Number of States 19
 Largest Geographic  
 Concentrations 25.7% Northern California
  15.3% Southern California
  13.1% Minnesota
 Largest SIC Codes 7.9% Gasoline Service Stations
  7.8% Apartment Building Owners
  7.5% Hotels and Motels
Avg. Loan Balance $373,058
Weighted Avg. Loan Rate 7.25%
Weighted Avg. LTV 72.4% 
Weighted Avg. Loan Seasoning 22.7 months
Security of Loans First and second mortgages  
  on commercial real estate;  
  equipment liens
Issuer’s Counsel Perkins Coie LLP,  
  Chicago, Illinois
Initial Purchaser Piper Jaffray & Co.,  
  Minneapolis, Minnesota
table 2: Ratings and Yields on notes
 Class Par Rating Yield
 Class A-1 $8,871,000  AAA 2.79%
 Class A-2  8,610,000  AAA 3.62
 Class A-3  8,610,000  AAA 4.25
 Class B  7,674,000  A 5.79
 Class C  6,523,000  BB 8.60
 Class D  3,000,000  NR 6.59
 Class E  2,814,000  NR 6.33
  $46,102,000  6.54%
table 1: CRF-17 Description
 Issuer CRF-17 LLC
 Servicer CRF, Inc
 Loan Originators Various community development corporations,  
  community development financial institutions,  
  governmental, non-profit and other community  
  development lenders.
 Trustee Wells Fargo Bank, NA
 Back-Up Servicer Wells Fargo Bank, NA
 Rating Agency Standard & Poor’s 
t R a n S a C t I o n  t e R M  S h e e t
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Standard and Poor’s 
an essential part of Standard and Poor’s due diligence analysis 
focused on CRF’s portfolio performance, which was substan-
tially better than the SBa program. after hundreds of hours 
of discussion, examination, and reexamination of the struc-
ture and supporting financial models, and countless “stress 
tests,” Standard and Poor’s recognized the credit-worthiness 
of community development loans, the strength of CRF’s 
management, its credit underwriting standards, and its credit 
analysis capabilities. This is evidenced by the public ratings 
awarded by Standard and Poor’s. 
Standard and Poor’s initially in 2002 questioned the 
economic feasibility of rating a relatively small transaction 
(originally planned for $25 million), particularly one in-
volving a new asset type. They believed the smaller deal size 
would not support Standard and Poor’s minimum rating fee 
of $75,000. 
Between July 2003 and March 2004, when CRF made 
its formal presentation to Standard and Poor’s, wall Street 
without walls advisors and the CRF team recognized and 
began to address these and other issues and concerns. The 
concerns ranged from transaction size, to loan accounting 
systems, servicing capabilities, underwriting standards of 
loans and their originators, loan documentation, diversifi-
cation issues, loan performance criteria, and loan modifica-
tions. 
early discussions with Standard and Poor’s representa-
tives enabled the CRF team to be better prepared in their 
formal ratings request. The team recognized early on that 
the Standard and Poor’s approach always includes a “worst-
case” stress test. 
Standard and Poor’s extensive review process occurred in 
april and May 2004 and was followed by a week-long on-
site visit to CRF in mid-summer. Standard and Poor’s was 
willing to devote the time necessary to understand the com-
munity development sector and its sometimes limited fi-
nancing capabilities; evaluate the performance and financial 
strengths of selected CDFI loan originators; and conduct a 
thorough evaluation of CRF and its capabilities. Initially, 
Standard and Poor’s intended to use its statistical/actuarial 
model to evaluate the CRF portfolio, but because the num-
ber of loans was small, senior managers decided to use their 
“Monte Carlo” model. This model is generally used for rela-
tively small portfolios of assets and is more time-consum-
ing in that it requires evaluations of individual loans in the 
portfolio. 
During the 14-month evaluation, Standard and Poor’s 
gained confidence in the CRF team and the credit-worthi-
ness of the loan portfolio. The rating agency and CRF con-
tinually evaluated, tested, and modified the structure and 
its supporting financial model. Both parties agreed on the 
final structure and cash flow, and Standard and Poor’s Credit 
Committee approved the ratings in august 2004. Standard 
and Poor’s will monitor the transaction until its final matu-
rity (the bonds mature between 2006 and 2013). 
Financial Guaranty Insurance 
a representative of the Financial Innovations Roundtable 
submitted the CRF transaction to five financial guaranty in-
surance companies for their consideration. Insurance would 
further reduce the risk for investors but would also lower 
yields slightly. none of the five insurers agreed to insure the 
transaction, even though no one doubted the credit-worthi-
ness of the assets or the transaction structure. They declined 
to insure instead because of the deal size, the new asset type, 
capital constraints at two companies, and the departure of the 
assigned analysts at two companies. all five companies insist-
ed on a Standard and Poor’s shadow rating (a non-public rat-
ing) before performing a complete analysis. The responses of 
the insurance companies indicated they would likely respond 
favorably to a similar transaction in the future. 
Conclusion
CRF-17 is the first publicly rated securitization of a pool of 
community development loans. The structure of the transac-
tion and its underlying credit strength has served as model 
for subsequent transactions and has become a standard 
model for CRF. Perhaps the most significant benefit is that 
the structure and rating attracted new, first-time institutional 
investors, including northwest Mutual life, western asset 
Management, CRa Fund advisors, and Glacier Bank, thereby 
successfully achieving the initial goal of bringing new classes 
of investors into the community development and affordable 
housing sectors.
Promoting Further Innovation
The CRF securitization allowed community development 
lenders to sell existing loans. The capital markets did not im-
pose standards on the underwriting given that lenders had 
During the 14-month evaluation, Standard 
and Poor’s gained confidence in the CRF team 
and the credit-worthiness of the loan portfolio.
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already originated these loans under existing CRF guidelines 
before CRF approached Standard and Poor’s. although not 
all loans originated by CDFIs will qualify for sale, clearly a 
number of these loans will (and do) 
qualify. CRF was also able to price loans 
according to the interest rates set by the 
originator. although highly subsidized 
loans originated by community develop-
ment lenders were discounted, it was not 
perceptions of risk that spurred discount-
ing; loans originated at near-market value 
were subject to very little or no discount-
ing. This addresses the community development lenders’ 
concern about price. Finally, the CRF loan structure allows 
originators to continue to service their loans, if they choose. 
Clearly there are opportunities for collaboration between the 
community development sector and conventional capital 
markets in ways that address the concerns of the community 
development lenders. Further innovation in the field will re-
quire collaboration and a measured approach to integration.
Collaboration
Collaboration is needed on a number of fronts. Community 
development lenders must collaborate with one another to 
develop basic standards for collecting data that capital mar-
kets need. The field must also develop a standard and effi-
cient infrastructure to collect data, track performance, per-
form back-office tasks, develop collection systems, trouble-
shoot, and report data. Community development lenders also 
should reach scale by more actively and deliberately pooling 
loans. CRF functions as an aggregator of loans, but more 
aggregators are needed. Regional aggregators can diversify 
pools of loans geographically and by asset class, work with 
ratings agencies, and help service the loans of those lenders 
who need it. 
In addition, collaboration is needed with foundations, gov-
ernment agencies and conventional capital markets. Govern-
ment and foundations can enhance the credit of loan pools 
just as the Ford Foundation did with Self-help (see p. 16). 
The CRF model involved a unique amount of collaboration 
among the ratings agency, the aggregator, foundations, and 
individual lenders. 
The Challenge of Integration
Can there be a downside to success? Ratliff and Moy raise in-
teresting issues involved in integrating CDFIs into the finan-
cial mainstream.8 They note that promising community de-
velopment products and services are often tested in commu-
nity development organizations and adopted by mainstream 
financial institutions. But what are the appropriate roles of 
CDFIs in this process? Should they serve as the research and 
development arm of more conventional fi-
nanciers, as a broker between low-income 
communities and mainstream financial 
institutions, or in other roles? 
The second question that arises is how 
best to structure a relationship between 
CDFIs and the mainstream. Such integra-
tion is the challenge facing CDFIs now. 
Ultimately the challenge is how to grow 
while maintaining a focus on the mission to support under-
served individuals and communities. not every organization 
can achieve scale. But for CDFIs as a group, the challenge is 
to develop the standards and practices that allow them to in-
tegrate with the financial mainstream and thus scale up, while 
not losing sight of their mission, and expand their base. This 
will require adopting standards, size, and data required by 
wall Street while maintaining the flexibility, creativity, and 
commitment that created the field in the first place. 
1 D. leibsohn, “Meeting Capital needs in low-Income Communities” (San 
Francisco: low Income housing Fund, 1995), pp. 3-4.
2 D. DiPasquale and J. l. Cummings, “accessing Capital Markets for afford-
able Rental housing.” In From the neighborhoods to the Capital Markets, 
(washington, DC: national task Force on affordable housing, 1992), p. a-27.
3 C. Beshouri and S. Glennon, “CRa as Market Development or tax: an 
analysis of lending Decisions and economic Development” (washington, 
DC: office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1996). 
4 k. Moy and a. okagaki, “Changing Capital Markets and Their Implica-
tions for Community Development Finance” (washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 2001).
5 G. Yago, B. zeidman, and B. Schmidt, “Creating Capital Jobs and wealth in 
emerging Domestic Markets” (los angeles: Milken Institute, 2003).
6 G. Stanton, “Unblocking obstacles to Capital Markets for Community 
Development lenders” (Manchester, nh: Community economic Develop-
ment Press, Southern new hampshire University, 2003).
7 I am indebted to wayne Marsden for his initial draft of the case detailed 
here.
8 G. Ratliff and k. Moy, “new Pathways to Scale for Community Devel-
opment Finance” (washington, DC: aspen Institute, 2004). available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/community_development/files/12_2004_
pnv_new_pathways_to_scale.pdf.
For CDFIs as a group, the 
challenge is to develop the stan-
dards and practices that allow 
them to integrate with the finan-
cial mainstream and thus scale 
up, while not losing sight of their 
mission.
18
Self-help is a leading nonprofit community develop-ment financial institution (CDFI) headquartered in Durham, north Carolina. It consists of the nonprofit 
Center for Community Self-help and two financing affiliates, 
Self-help Credit Union and Self-help Ventures Fund. Its mis-
sion is to create ownership and economic opportunities for 
minorities, women, rural 
residents, and low-wealth 
families. Since 1980, Self-
help has provided more 
than $5.3 billion in financ-
ing to more than 63,000 
small business enterprises, not-for-profit organizations, and 
homeowners. It operates eight regional offices in north Caro-
lina and maintains offices in washington, D.C. and oakland, 
California.
In the 1990s, the Self-help Ventures Fund began to address 
the problem of limited capital for affordable home loans. as 
described elsewhere, lenders providing conventional mort-
gages had begun to bundle them and sell them to investors on 
the secondary market, accessing a virtually limitless supply of 
cash to make more loans. In contrast, “nonconforming” loans 
made by lenders trying to meet Community Reinvestment 
act (CRa) requirements were severely constrained. having 
no outlet to sell these loans, lenders would limit the number 
or stop making them altogether. 
Self-help’s response began with a pilot program in 1994, 
when it purchased a $20 million CRa loan portfolio from a 
north Carolina bank looking to increase its originations in 
support of its CRa program. The lender’s portfolio contained 
loans with high loan-to-value ratios and no mortgage insur-
ance and loans to borrowers with blemished credit histories 
and limited incomes. This initial stage proved that the risk of 
affordable home loans could be effectively managed. 
These loans were underwritten to avoid the problems asso-
ciated with the subprime and alt-a loans that are now so toxic 
to many of our financial institutions. The loans purchased by 
Self-help are 30-year fixed rate loans with no interest rate 
re-sets or payment shocks. Borrower income is verified and 
loans are underwritten for the ability of the borrower to pay 
over the full term of the loan. Furthermore there are no pre-
payment penalties that prevent borrowers from refinancing 
should they qualify for a better loan. Consequently Self-help’s 
Secondary Market loan portfolio has performed well during 
the current mortgage crisis when subprime mortgages are de-
faulting at record rates. 
In 1998, Self-help’s secondary market expanded nationally 
with the convergence of two partnerships. First, Self-help 
received a $50 million grant from 
the Ford Foundation (at that time 
the largest commitment made by 
a philanthropic institution to pro-
mote homeownership), which it 
used as a loan loss reserve to cover 
the credit risk on financed loans. with this reserve, Self-help 
could guarantee loans with credit characteristics, such as low 
credit scores, high loan-to-value ratios, or no mortgage insur-
ance, that could have made them ineligible for sale. with Self-
help bearing most of the risk in case of borrower defaults, 
Fannie Mae agreed to purchase the pools of credit-enhanced 
mortgages, bundle them into securities, and sell them in the 
capital markets. Banks around the country committed to re-
deploy the proceeds by making additional low-income mort-
gages.
Fannie Mae’s initial commitment was to purchase $2 bil-
lion in Community advantage Program mortgages over five 
years. By 2004, Self-help exceeded its $2 billion target, lever-
aging the Ford grant 40 times over, and Fannie Mae agreed 
to extend the program. Since 1998, Self-help’s Community 
advantage home loan Secondary Market Program has pro-
duced $4.5 billion in mortgages to more than 49,500 families 
nationwide. The program’s flexible terms accommodate the 
financing needs of lower-wealth, higher credit-risk borrow-
ers. Borrower income must be at or below 80% of area median 
income or 115% of area median income in low- and moder-
ate-income or minority census tracts. higher and more flex-
ible ratios (e.g., single ratios of 42%, and loan-to-value ratios 
up to 100%) and minimum down payments as low as 1% or 
$500 allow low-income borrowers to purchase the homes that 
are available in their area. Manual analysis of credit, or lower 
than standard credit score floors (as low as 580), help address 
the needs of borrowers who may be credit-worthy now but 
have blemished credit histories. In addition, there may be no 
mortgage insurance requirement, and it is permitted for clos-
Self-help’s affordable home loan  
Secondary Market Program
Michael Swack and NoÉmi Giszpenc, with Robert Schall
Although flexibilities are built into Self-Help’s 
loan products with lenders, all its products are craft-
ed to prevent the presence of multiple exceptions to 
conventional credit criteria in the same loan.
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ing costs to be gifted by family or friends. although such flex-
ibilities are built into Self-help’s loan products with lenders, 
all its products are crafted to prevent the presence of multiple 
exceptions to conventional credit criteria in the same loan. 
This allows it to expand homeownership boundaries while 
maintaining the financial integrity of its loan programs.
after ten years of operating history, studies have shown 
that Community advantage borrowers:
1. have an income 64% of their respective area’s median
2. are 46% minority borrowers
3. saw the median value of their home equity increase 
by $17,500 between 1998 and 2002
4. rarely miss a payment: more than 80% of borrowers 
have never been delinquent in making a mortgage 
payment (still true in 2008, as the financial crisis un-
folds)
The loans performed well in the first five years of the pro-
gram. loan loss rates were very low (average annual loss rate 
of 0.13%) even compared with conventional mortgages. From 
the program’s inception to September, 2008, Self-help has 
taken 0.8% loan losses on over $4.5 billion in mortgages, with 
this year’s losses higher than past years at around 0.45%. These 
rates are very low, even by prime loan standards. a study com-
pleted in 2003 by the University of north Carolina at Chapel 
hill revealed that 0.7% of Self-help’s secondary market bor-
rowers had defaulted on their mortgages compared with an 
average 1.1% default rate among all borrowers nationwide 
during that time period. From January 2007 through June 
2008, delinquency rates have risen, as they have throughout 
the industry, but this has not led to many more foreclosures. 
This year, about 1.2% of Self-help’s loans will be foreclosed 
on, compared to 2.75% of mortgages nationally (by the end of 
the second quarter). This may, in part, stem from Self-help’s 
active role in servicing the loans, particularly default man-
agement. Self-help’s loss mitigation strategies include loan 
counseling programs, flexible alternatives to foreclosure, and 
special initiatives to address sudden and unforeseen events.
Through the Secondary Market Program, Self-help dem-
onstrated that, with responsible lending, low-wealth families 
make good borrowers and sound investments. The Program 
affords Fannie Mae an opportunity to better understand the 
risks associated with nontraditional mortgages and refine its 
performance measurements. Many private financial institu-
tions have also developed products similar to Self-help’s, sig-
nificantly expanding the market for responsible low-income 
mortgages. This work provides an important counterpoint to 
the irresponsible practices that fueled the current subprime 
crisis.
For more on this program, contact secondarymarketin-
fo@self-help.org, or see www.self-help.org.
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editor’s note: Several of the articles in this document point 
to the ever-growing capital needs of the community econom-
ic development and affordable housing sectors and ways to 
attract new and efficient capital sources. The article on the 
issuance of a rated asset-backed security by the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Fund (p. 11), in which we read that sev-
eral companies rejected CRF-Series 17 for other than credit 
quality reasons, demonstrated that seasoned financial guar-
anty insurance companies lack familiarity with community 
economic development assets. This article describes a solu-
tion: the creation of a publicly-rated, specialty financial guar-
anty (municipal bond) insurance company with a focus on 
insuring financings in these sectors. This paper will provide 
insights into Community Development assurance (“CDa”), 
which is currently seeking some $300 million in initial equity 
capital. 
Financial guaranty insurance is an irrevocable, non-can-
celable, third-party guaranty of the timely payment of prin-
cipal and interest (as scheduled) on the insured transaction. 
The public rating of the financial guarantor transfers to the 
transaction, thereby enhancing the borrower’s credit, lower-
ing the cost of borrowing, and improving the marketability of 
the transaction. a wider range of potential investors can be 
attracted by the added security and liquidity of the insured 
transaction. 
A New Company to Address the Problem
today there are no financial guaranty insurance companies 
providing credit enhancement guarantees in the community 
economic development (“CeD”) sectors. There are a number 
of reasons: unfamiliarity with the underlying credit quality, 
small deal sizes, and differing underwriting processes and 
disciplines between the asset types that make up their cur-
rent core business and CeD transactions, which may include 
characteristics found in public, mortgage, corporate and 
structured finance. There is little incentive for seasoned and 
higher rated financial guaranty companies to expand their 
focus and serve the CeD market segment. The global credit 
crisis of 2008, initially caused by the sub-prime mortgage 
meltdown and entailing downgrades in the ratings of many 
of the financial guarantors, makes it even more unlikely that 
these companies will commit the time and resources to serve 
the CeD sectors. 
CDa will be the first financial guaranty insurance (bond 
insurance) company with a focus on insuring qualified CeD 
sector financings. The term CDa refers interchangeably to 
Community Development assurance holdings, Inc. (a Dela-
ware incorporated holding company) and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary, Community Development assurance Company, a 
new state-regulated insurance company, which will become 
operational after a planned capital stock offering. 
The size and underlying credit quality of the CeD sectors 
are not well known in the capital markets. It is envisioned 
that CDa will help to establish minimum credit underwriting 
standards for these sectors. over time they should become 
recognized as the industry standard by those CeD originators 
and aggregators who look to the capital markets. CDa’s entry 
and positioning in the market will provide the targeted sec-
tors with improved access to the capital markets. as both so-
cially responsive and market-return investors become more 
aware of the underlying credit quality of the sectors, partici-
pants will benefit from a growing supply of available capital at 
more attractive rates. 
The Focus of CDA
CDa will offer financial guaranty insurance, credit-related 
insurance products and technical financial assistance to qual-
ified participants in its targeted sectors. The CDa organiza-
tion will provide credit enhancement guarantees through the 








The Formation of Community Development 
assurance (CDa) 
Wayne A. Marsden
CDA will be the first financial guaranty 
insurance (bond insurance) company with a focus 
on insuring qualified CED sector financings.
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Target Markets and Business Types 
CDa will target the following types of municipal and CeD 
financial transactions in both the primary (new issue) and 
secondary (seasoned, previously issued) markets:
•	 Public	and	Small	Business	Finance,	including:
 - small business loans;
 - affordable housing (single and multi-family): work-
force, military, immigrant, native american, people 
of color and senior housing;
 - industrial and economic development;
 - education: charter schools, vocational schools, 
community colleges and other post-secondary in-
stitutions;
 - lease financings;
 - community service and facility improvements;
 - nonprofits;
 - environmental, resource recovery and alternative 
energy sources; and
 - healthcare: long-term, specialty and community-
focused.
•	 Structured	Finance,	such	as:
 - asset-backed securities backed by: small business 
loans, micro-finance loans, financial institution 
capital notes, trade receivables, tax credits, and 
lease receivables; and
 - mortgage-backed securities: single- and multi-fam-
ily residential with an affordable component, immi-
grant mortgages, workforce housing, military, and 
senior housing.
CDA will not insure derivative or synthetic CDOs. It will 
require “hard” asset collateral and iron-clad security pro-
visions. 
•	 Possible	specialty	products	may	include:
 - portfolio insurance;
 - deposit and loan guarantees;
 - performance / surety bonds;
 - forward insurance commitments; and
 - credit protection insurance products.
•	 Financial	technical	advisory:	on	a	fee	basis,	the	service	
company will provide:
 - deal structuring, when insurance is not used;
 - social impact reporting;
 - portfolio credit monitoring / surveillance; and
 - administration and management of established 
guarantee funds.
In the future CDa will consider insuring international 
CeD transactions. 
CDa will be responsive in balancing the needs of institu-
tional investors and CeD sector participants. The primary 
beneficiaries of CDa’s presence in the market will include, 
among others: 
•	 Community	development	and	small	business	loan	orig-









at the same time, CDa will be addressing the needs of 
philanthropic and mission-related investors looking for, in 
addition to social impact, leverage of their limited resources, 
sustainability, credit analysis, and deal structuring. The pri-
mary beneficiaries of CDa’s core business, however, will be 
institutional investors. These capital market players are look-
ing for return, security, soundness, ratings, standardization 
and scale, Community Reinvestment act/socially responsible 
investor (CRa/SRI) credit, tax credits, and credit surveillance 
(monitoring). By offering products targeted to CeD sectors 
that also conform to the expectations of institutional inves-
tors, CDa will build a bridge from philanthropy and com-
munity developers to the capital markets. 
The Importance of Ratings
CDa plans to seek an “a” claims-paying ability rating by at 
least one national statistical rating organization (Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s, or Fitch). CDa requires a public rating to 
facilitate business opportunities with its strategic business 
partners, such as reinsurance companies and other financial 
institutions. CDa intends to maintain sufficient capital levels 
and be managed to sustain its public rating. 
a financial guaranty insurance company’s public rating 
By offering products targeted to CED sectors that 
also conform to the expectations of institutional 
investors, CDA will build a bridge from philan-
thropy and community developers to the capital 
markets. 
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conveys (“passes through”) to the transactions it insures as 
evidence of the credit enhancement to investors. an insured 
and rated transaction pays less interest, while improving its 
marketability. 
The ultimate public ratings on CDa-qualified transactions 
will be based on: 
1. the structure of the transaction; 
2. credit enhancements within the structure of each trans-
action, including, among other things, over-collateral-
ization, reserve accounts, interest spread accounts, and 
debt service reserves; 
3. primary financial guaranty insurance; 
4. letters of credit; 
5. reinsurance; 
6. other third-party guarantees; and 
7. first loss coverage. 
CDa intends to be actively involved in structuring each 
transaction it insures and will rely on input from potential 
institutional investors. when appropriate, CDa will co-in-
sure or reinsure (cede) senior credit tranches to higher-rated 
primary insurance and reinsurance companies. transac-
tion structures may also use “cut-through endorsements” by 
which the rating of the reinsurer will convey, and thereby ap-
ply, to the specific transaction. Possible reinsurers will include 
mono-line reinsurance companies, banks, pension funds, 
foundations, mortgage insurance companies and multi-line 
insurance companies with Financial enhancement Ratings 
(“FeRs,” issued by Standard & Poor’s) of “a ” or higher.
another advantage of a public rating accrues to the com-
pany’s reinsurers and co-insurers in the form of reduced 
risk-based capital charges. 
like many regulated finan-
cial institutions, insurance 
companies are required to 
maintain risk-weighted re-
serves. If the risks retained 
and assumed are well-
understood and rated, the 
capital requirements will be correspondingly lower, allowing 
greater leverage and higher returns to equity.
Ratings reduce uncertainty and increase standardization. 
Thus, acquiring insurance on a transaction from a rated com-
pany takes the “story” out of the instrument: investors no lon-
ger need to know very much about it—its origin, purpose, 
beneficiaries, etc.—to decide whether or not to buy it. a pub-
lic rating also aids in mark-to-market valuations. 
CDA’s Equity Investors 
CDa should be attractive to both mission-related and mar-
ket-driven equity investors. The benefits include: double-
digit rates of return; a public-purpose business strategy with 
on-going tracking of social impact and likely exit strategies; 
bringing new efficient sources of capital investment into com-
munity development sectors; and revenue opportunities from 
collaborating on proprietary insurance products. 
Perhaps the greatest benefit that CDa offers to mission-
related investors is a very high leverage ratio, providing a big 
bang for socially-responsive bucks. a direct philanthropic 
or social investment or guarantee leads to only a one-to-one 
impact—$1 million financed is $1 million financed, end of 
story. an equity investment in CDa, on the other hand, can 
be multiplied many times. The plan assumes a relatively con-
servative leverage ratio of more than 40-to-1 in total principal 
and interest exposure to capital and equivalents (the historic 
industry average was as high as 160-to-1). 
The substantial economic impact comes with a healthy rate 
of return to equity investors. CDa will be managed to achieve 
a greater than 15% rate of return on its equity, in addition to 
any capital gains that come from stock appreciation. 
CDA Business Objectives
CDa’s primary business objective is to provide capital mar-
kets access to the CeD sectors, which will ultimately lower 
CeD issuer borrowing costs. The company will facilitate and 
structure transactions of near-investment grade credit quality 
that meet its own minimum credit standards and criteria. a 
CDa policy will enhance the credit quality and subsequent 
credit rating of securities 
and obligations issued by 
qualified sector participants. 
More importantly, as inves-
tors become more familiar 
with CDa and the underly-
ing strength of the issues it 
insures, market access will 
be enhanced, resulting in lower borrowing costs. 
a simplified example transaction will show the economic 
benefit of a CDa credit enhancement. take a $10 million, 
20-year, tax-exempt, “BB equivalent” unrated, charter school 
financing with an uninsured 6.75% coupon. If this bond is-
sue is insured by CDa, the resulting “a” rating on the issue 
would generate an apparent yield savings (for simplicity’s 
sake) of approximately 1%. with lower interest payments on 
the bonds, even after deducting the CDa insurance premium, 
Acquiring insurance on a transaction from a rated 
company takes the “story” out of the instrument: investors 
no longer need to know very much about it—its origin, 
purpose, beneficiaries, etc.—to decide whether or not to 
buy it.
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the bond issuers would save the present value of $275,000 in 
debt service. 
The market will accept lower yields as it becomes familiar 
with CDa’s unencumbered financial strength and its conser-
vative underwriting standards. a CDa policy will improve 
the quality of the transactions by providing an unconditional 
and irrevocable guaranty of the timely payment of principal 
and interest as scheduled. CDa may insure entire transac-
tions or just subordinate credit tranches, or it may provide 
first loss coverage on a selective basis. In contrast with bank 
letters or certain other credit enhancements, CDa can pro-
vide longer-term guarantees, because in the event of a default, 
there is no acceleration of debt service. In the event that the 
issuer is unable to make a scheduled debt service payment, 
a claim will be submitted by the trustee on the transaction, 
CDa will make the missed payments on schedule, while it 
initiates remedial action to resolve the cause of the default. 
when the problem is corrected and the issuer experiences a 
positive cash flow and resumes its debt service payments to 
investors, it will be required to repay CDa for its missed pay-
ments, plus interest. 
CDa will require that all financing submissions have an 
underlying credit quality of “BB” or higher, with a high prob-
ability of making debt service and with iron-clad security 
provisions. CDa will use its expertise and competencies in 
credit analysis, risk management and surveillance (moni-
toring) to analyze, select, and manage transactions. 
when analyzing a submitted transaction, CDa’s credit 
underwriters will consider: use of proceeds; essentiality; 
likelihood of paying debt service (in terms of financial abil-
ity and willingness); authority to enter into the transaction; 
deal structure; and covenants and protections (security, col-
lateral and guarantees). CDa will publish detailed underwrit-
ing guidelines and criteria for each financing type and asset 
type it insures. CDa will also require security provisions 
and financial covenants, such as gross revenue pledges, state 
aid intercepts, mortgages, funded debt service and liquidity 
reserves, additional debt restrictions, etc. with all of these 
underwriting measures, CDa should experience “zero loss 
probability in the event a claim is paid”. 
CDa will employ other measures to manage potential 
credit risk exposure. These include: use of a profitability 
model, pro-active portfolio surveillance, reinsurance, standby 
credit and capital facilities. 
CDA Business Plan
CDa’s financial results will be based on its two operating busi-
ness segments: bond insurance on municipal and CeD bonds 
and selected structured finance (asset-backed securities) as 
well as financial and technical advisory services. a range of 
services and products are being designed for issuers and in-
stitutional investors. each transaction will be structured to 
attract a wide universe of institutional buyers. In fact, CDa 
plans to employ at least one marketing professional to focus 
exclusively on developing relationships with institutional 
buyers. In general, CDa will be opportunistic in its busi-
ness development activities by exploiting its core competen-
cies: credit analysis, risk management, surveillance, financial 
soundness and sector knowledge.
The launch of CDa promises to put in place an essential 
piece of the puzzle to capital market access for the community 
development and affordable housing sectors.
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The Purpose of the Co-op
other articles have described the advantages of selling assets 
such as community development loans to the secondary capi-
tal markets as a way to replenish liquid-
ity and originate more loans. Some larger 
CDFIs are already aggregating loans from 
smaller CDFIs or from conventional lend-
ers. But before those aggregators can offer 
asset-backed securities to investors, they 
must establish a sufficient volume of loans. 
In the interim, aggregators must “ware-
house” the loans, holding them in a portfolio until they can be 
bundled as securities and sold. each CDFI providing aggrega-
tion and warehousing services must obtain a separate line of 
credit from its bank. 
to expand the range of borrowing options available to 
high-capacity CDFIs and help them to lower their funding 
costs, members of the Financial Innovations Roundtable have 
proposed creating a Commercial Paper Cooperative owned by 
CDFIs. The co-op would provide its members access to the 
commercial paper market, and reduce the time, complexity, 
and cost of borrowing. Due to the current credit crisis in 2008-
09, this effort is temporarily “on hold.”
Commercial Paper’s Relevance to CDFIs
Commercial paper is a form of short-term borrowing (an 
unsecured promissory note) used by many corporations to 
finance a wide range of assets with diverse maturities and 
varying levels of risk. assets financed include credit card debt, 
used car loans, home mortgages, and small business loans. 
although the maximum maturity of commercial paper is 270 
days, most commercial paper issuers roll over their notes at 
maturity, effectively borrowing long-term at short-term rates. 
They are able to do this because banks and other large finan-
cial institutions provide a combination of liquidity and credit 
enhancement to protect the commercial paper investor from 
any losses from the inherent asset-liability mismatch. Com-
mercial paper (unlike bonds) is also exempt from Security and 
exchange Commission registration, which lowers issuance 
costs. For most institutions, particularly in the financial sector, 
commercial paper provides the least expensive form of (non-
deposit) financing over time. 
Banks allow their best customers to issue commercial pa-
per, borrowing from the bank at the prime rate, or a spread 
over Federal Reserve funds; the london InterBank Borrow-
ing Rate (lIBoR), which is the cost at which banks lend to 
one another; or another similar 
index. The co-op is designed to 
help banks provide the same 
flexibility and cost advantage 
to their best CDFI clients. CD-
FIs do not have access to this 
kind of funding primarily be-
cause they lack access to the commercial paper market. They 
lack this access because of the size of borrowing need and be-
cause rating agencies are unfamiliar with the types of assets 
that CDFIs originate. The co-op is designed to overcome both 
impediments by aggregating CDFI borrowings so they are of 
sufficient scale and by placing CDFI secured and unsecured 
obligations in a funding framework that obtains the highest 
quality ratings and lowest available rates.
Summary of the Co-op Proposal
Six large, high-capacity CDFIs are forming a cooperative to 
access cutting-edge, short-term funding. The co-op has the 
following features:
•	 $100	million	in	size,	with	up	to	$75	million	extended	to	
the six CDFIs at any time
•	 Warehouse	 financing	 to	 the	 six	 member	 CDFIs	 in	
amounts up to $15 million each
•	 Sub-limits	 for	co-op	members	relative	 to	 the	 type	and	
quality of the assets being financed by the CDFIs
•	 Ability	of	CDFIs	to	borrow	for	30	days	and	roll	over	the	
maturity until the pledged assets are sold or replaced; 
CDFIs borrow for periods matching the length of time 
they hold the assets, but not for more than 270 days
•	 Access	to	a	range	of	pricing	options,	including	commer-




•	 Loans	 to	 CDFIs	 are	 secured	 by	 the	 loans	 that	 CDFIs	
pledge. Rather than paper, CDFIs use the Mortgage 
electronic Registration System for tracking and moni-
toring security.
The Commercial Paper Co-op
Charles Tansey, Neighborworks America
The co-op is designed to help 
banks provide the same flexibility 






by banks guaranteeing payments of principal and inter-
est to investors, enabling the co-op to issue top-quality, 
short-term notes to a commercial paper conduit that 
issues commercial paper to the public.
Summary of the Benefits
Reduced Rates
Several CDFIs borrow from banks to fund the origination and 
aggregation of loans they intend to sell. In return for funding, 
CDFIs pledge the loans they are originating and aggregating. 
when they sell the loans, they pay off the warehousing lines. 
at present, the warehousing lines are individually negotiated, 
and the terms and conditions vary considerably from one 
CDFI to the next. By gaining access to the commercial paper 
market via a centralized cooperative, participating CDFIs can 
minimize their borrowing rates and the risk associated with 
working with a limited number of lenders.
Reduced Costs
The pledging process involves, among other things, the physi-
cal transfer of promissory notes and related documents from 
a CDFI to the lender when the CDFI borrows, and the return 
of the physical documents when the loan is paid off. The pro-
posed framework will enable CDFI participants to transfer 
documents electronically instead. although the co-op still 
cannot perfect a security interest electronically (that is, take 
all the necessary legal steps and file all the required papers 
to establish a claim on the asset), the electronic transfer does 
reduce the potential for error and speeds the transaction. 
with its capital and layered protections, the co-op insulates 
the commercial paper investors and banks that are providing 
the liquidity facility from the risk of eliminating paper trans-
actions. In addition to the time and cost associated with this 
activity, the warehousing lines often involve annual renewal, 
renewal fees, legal costs and other requirements. The co-op 
will consolidate and absorb these on behalf of the participat-
ing CDFIs.
Increased Flexibility
Many warehousing lines provided by banks restrict the bor-
rower to pledging only new loans. one of the chief objectives 
of the co-op is to enable the participating CDFIs to pledge 
existing loans that conform to the allowable terms and con-
ditions for each asset class. Clearly seasoned loans are less 
risky than new loans, and in addition to providing the CDFI 
borrower with more flexibility, this expansion also produces 
a potentially higher quality of collateral. The moral hazard in-
herent in this structure is mitigated because the borrowers 
also own the co-op; there is no incentive to pass on or pledge 
weak loans (which in any case would not be accepted if they 
did not fit the previously agreed-on standards). 
Access to the Rating Agencies 
one of the chief benefits of this structure is that participating 
CDFIs can place their assets in a facility that rating agencies 
will monitor or evaluate on a dynamic basis. Participation 
will also allow CDFIs to showcase their capacity to service 
assets, another key area that rating agencies do not currently 
monitor routinely evaluate. exposure in both areas will help 
move CDFIs toward the ultimate objective of being rated on 
their organizational and financial strength. The electronic 
rather than paper-based security interests (claims on assets) 
of the co-op could accelerate this process. These benefits are 
not limited to the participating CDFIs. over time, as the ex-
posure expands to more CDFIs, this structure will accommo-
date greater risk parameters, including unsecured loans.
The co-op, however, is not designed to replace existing 
bank warehousing lines or other lending facilities. although 
participants may choose to reduce the lines, the co-op can-
not replace the relationship or the range of funding options 
that banks can provide. Its purpose is to augment existing 
relationships and provide the key banks with an alternative, 
and potentially more effective and remunerative, method for 
lending to the community development field (see “Structure 
of the Co-op,” below). 
Potential Participants
The six potential participants include: 
•	 Self-Help	(single	family	first	mortgages)
•	 Neighborhood	Housing	Services	of	America	(single-
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types of loans; see Manufactured housing article,  
p. 38)
each of the six participants has assets in excess of $50 mil-
lion, has been in existence for more than 10 years, and has 
warehousing lines from commercial banks to support their 
borrowing and aggregation activities. none of the participants 
has been delinquent on any of its loan agreements in the past 
10 years.
Structure of the Co-op
Existing Commercial Paper Conduit
a number of lending institutions serving the CDFI industry 
have multiple commercial paper conduits. Using an existing 
conduit will reduce the start-up costs. however, the primary 
purpose is to ensure that the funding obtained for CDFI bor-
rowing is indistinguishable from any other paper in the mar-
ket. one of the chief objectives of the co-op is to eliminate 
the need for subsidy and the collateral consumption of scarce 
social investment and foundation resources. In keeping with 
market practice, the conduit must assure commercial inves-
tors they will be paid. as a result, the conduit requires that the 
co-op provide a 100% liquidity facility that guarantees timely 
payment of principal and interest. Under this structure, mar-
ket investors will not look to the underlying CDFIs or their 
assets, nor will the rating agencies need to evaluate them. In 
effect, CDFI assets will benefit from an a-1/P-1 rating without 
being scrutinized by either investors or rating agencies.
Banks
The co-op will work with a lead bank to arrange a syndicate (a 
group of banks that share equally in the risk) for the liquidity 
and credit enhancement features. The lead institution will first 
invite banks currently providing credit or warehouse lines to 
the participating CDFIs. This will limit the learning curve as-
sociated with the inherent risks, which has proved a material 
impediment for many conventional lenders and capital mar-
kets. The co-op will provide the banks with reduced risk-based 
capital allocation against the same assets; the same CRa ben-
efits that pertain to bank warehousing lines; and at minimum, 
a market return. (See also box on banks, below.)
The Co-op
The co-op will be CDFI-owned with the sole purpose to en-
able participating CDFIs to access funds provided by the com-
mercial paper market and banks on a consistent, low-cost, 
easy-to-use basis. The co-op will require the following of the 
participating CDFIs: regularly reported, sound performance 
data; maintenance of financial condition; compliance with 
stop-issuance triggers; and security interests appropriate to 
the transaction. The stop-issuance triggers and security inter-
ests are similar to those required by the banks. The co-op will 
have an administrator and a transfer agent who are distinct 
from the banks in the liquidity facility. The co-op will also hire 
What’s In It for the Banks?
The chief difference between the proposed co-op and existing bank 
warehousing lines is that the banks’ obligor (debtor) is the co-op. 
Rather than having a direct security interest in the loans being ware-
housed by six different CDFIs, banks will have a direct security inter-
est in the notes of CDFIs, which are secured, in turn, by those loans. 
In effect the banks are one step removed from the assets. 
however, in substitution for the direct claim on assets, the banks 
will receive the following:
1. First loss: a direct claim on co-op capital. The capital serves 
as a first loss against the total $100 million value of the facil-
ity. Because the co-op is designed to generate surpluses, this is 
likely to grow as a percentage of the total facility.
2. asset Security: First lien interest in the co-op’s assets. The 
co-op’s assets consist of CDFI notes that are at least 90% se-
cured by mortgages. 
3. Collateral Cushion: The co-op will make advances against 
CDFI short-term secured notes on a borrowing base formula 
that provides a collateral cushion specific to the assets being 
financed.
4. liquidity: The co-op will maintain a minimum of 15% of the 
total facility in high-quality investment-grade instruments.
5. early warning: The co-op will enforce “stop issue” triggers 
designed to identify deteriorating trends at a member CDFI 
and to terminate its ability to roll notes over if the trends are 
negative.
6. the Capacity of the obligors: Members are selected on 
the basis of their size, longevity, and performance. 
7. a Diversified Portfolio: For the same dollar of community 
investment, the bank gets a much more diversified portfolio in 
terms of obligor, geography, asset class, and risk.
In effect, the banks will be gaining a first loss reserve, liquidity, trig-
ger mechanisms, and portfolio diversification they previously did not 
have. These factors enable the banks to reduce their capital allocation 
against community development assets of the type being financed. 
The estimated capital allocation banks must set aside is 0.58% 
(the norm is 6% to 8% capital set-asides on the balance sheet). If the 
bank charges 0.375% as expected (see “Cost assumptions,” below) for 
the liquidity facility, the return on capital to banks is 64.66%, which 
should be reasonably attractive.
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one to two full-time employees to manage the interests of the 
CDFI owners. The configuration of the staffing is to be deter-
mined. 
CDFI Borrowers
CDFI participants will have the option to borrow under their 
existing credit facilities with their banks or with the co-op. 
Depending on events in the market on any given day, the 
co-op may or may not be more attractive than the financing 
provided by the banks. as with their corporate counterparts, 
it will be up to the CDFI treasurers to determine which fund-
ing source is preferable. The procedures for borrowing under 
warehousing lines are currently cumbersome, costly, and pa-
per-intensive. The co-op will minimize the time and money 
associated with the secured CDFI notes.
Grants and Program-Related Investments 
to attract the liquidity facility from banks as required by 
the conduit, the co-op will 
a p p r o a c h corporations, 
financial in- stitutions, and 
foundations for capital from 
both grants and program-
related in- vestments (for 
more about PRIs, see heron Foundation article, p. 27). The 
present target is for $5 million in grants and $15 million in 
program-related investments at 1% for 10 years (although 
more might be needed in the current market). together with 
start-up costs, this amount will serve as the only social invest-
ment subsidy in the co-op structure, as the co-op is designed 
to be self-supporting and generate surpluses. The capital is 
expected to grow over time via the co-op surpluses. Members 
of the co-op, who are also the borrowers, will determine the 
level of surpluses.
Borrowing Process
a CDFI would access the commercial paper market in the 
following steps:
1. It asks to borrow $5 million from the co-op for 30 days to 
fund loans it is warehousing.
2. The co-op immediately borrows $5 million for 30 days 
from the commercial paper conduit. The conduit has 
been selected by the co-op to issue commercial paper on 
the co-op’s behalf. The conduit is operated by a major fi-
nancial institution.
3. The conduit issues a-1/P-1 rated commercial paper in 
the amount of $5 million for 30 days. The commercial 
paper is purchased by institutional investors.
4. The co-op, which has issued short-term promissory notes 
to the conduit in the amount of $5 million for 30 days, 
receives the proceeds of the conduit’s commercial paper 
issue.
5. The CDFI, which has issued short-term promissory notes 
to the co-op, receives the proceeds from these notes.
6. The transactions are simultaneous.
Commercial Paper Co-op
Aggregates Secured Notes from CDFI Obligors
Issues Secured Co-op Notes to Conduit 





























Chart 1: Commercial Paper Co-op
Members of the co-op, 
who are also the bor-
rowers, will determine 
the level of surpluses.
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at the end of 30 days, the CDFI sells the warehoused loans 
and retires the debt to the co-op, which in turn retires the debt 
to the conduit. If the warehoused loans are not sold, or if new 
loans are to be warehoused at maturity, the CDFI may pay the 
notes off with the issuance of new notes. This effectively rolls 
the debt over and extends the term of the financing. Most enti-
ties participating in the commercial paper market borrow on 
30-day maturities to get the lowest rates, and they tend to roll 
them over at maturity. 
The co-op assumes most borrowers will want to borrow for 
30 days at a time to benefit from the lowest pricing and roll 
over three or four times before repaying through loan sale or 
other means. It also assumes that funding needs typically do 
not exceed 120 days and in no event exceed 270 days.
at present, only loans that are funded by banks under their 
warehousing lines will be eligible as assets to be financed. 
These loans and mortgages are typically in the process of be-
ing aggregated by the CDFI for sale, securitization or other 
form of off-balance sheet placement. The co-op will also seek 
to include loans and mortgages that have already been origi-
nated, are seasoned and are on the bal-
ance sheet of the borrowing CDFI. The 
key focus for the co-op will be on de-
veloping a relatively homogeneous set 
of asset classes with a portfolio distribu-
tion that is compatible with CDFI par-
ticipant needs.
Looking to the Future
over time, the performance of the co-
op should allow more flexibility and 
fewer costs. as the CDFIs and their 
assets perform, the level of first loss 
protection can be reduced; the overall 
facility can increase from $100 million 
to $200 million, $500 million, or more. 
alternatively, the co-op can introduce 
higher risk or less common forms of 
assets, such as social enterprise, prede-
velopment or nonprofit working capital 
assets. The co-op might also fund posi-
tions longer than 30 days. 
one of the most important effects of 
the co-op will be the emergence of data 
sets of sufficient size and quality to es-
tablish solid conclusions about the per-
formance of community development 
lenders and the loans that they make. 
This should contribute to the ratability 
of the CDFI participants, and eventu-
ally to the ratability of other CDFIs and 
their assets. 
Key Cost Assumptions
Fees: 0.25% for the letter of Credit, payable quarterly each year
 0.125% for the bank syndicate manager payable quarterly each year
 Set-up fee to be determined.
Management: estimated at $250,000 per year, rising at the rate of inflation. This is probably 
high. It is unclear whether the co-op will require more than one full-time 
employee to manage the interests of the members. This need will be deter-
mined by the co-op members.
Analysis:  The CDFI assessment and Rating System and/or other annual financial 
analyses for evaluating the financial health and performance of the six 
CDFI members is expected to cost $10,000 per analysis.
Dealer: The fee for the administrator/dealer is 0.25% on total outstanding obligations.
Miscellaneous: Miscellaneous expense allowance of $50,000, rising at the rate of inflation.
Charge-offs: assumptions about charge-offs depend on the risk allocation among asset 
classes and the total outstanding obligations. This assumption errs on the 
side of caution given that none of the CDFI borrowers has been delinquent 
on loans during the past ten years and there have been no charge-offs. nev-




On the revenue side:
Interest Rate: The co-op will charge its borrower-members 75 basis points (0.75%) over 
the a1/P1 commercial paper rate. Borrowers will also have the option to 
borrow at 75 basis points over lIBoR, or at the equivalent spread over 
alternative bank cost of funds. This spread is designed to cover a large por-
tion of the costs of the co-op.
Investments: The co-op will invest contributed capital and PRI funds, as well as cash, in 
high-quality, short-term and long-term investments, earning revenue and 
contributing to surpluses.
Charles Tansey is the author of Securitizing organizational Risk in Capital Markets: wins, losses, and opportunities for 
CDFIs, which details the Commercial Paper Co-op Project, the Capital Exchange, the Mini-Fed, and aligned efforts to access the 
capital markets, along with the reasons for their mixed results and recommendations for future success, particularly once the cur-
rent turmoil in markets has eased.
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Founded in 1992 with the mission of helping people and communities to help themselves, the F.B. heron Foundation came into being during one of the greatest 
economic booms in U.S. history. The strong financial markets 
of the 1990s not only spurred rapid growth of heron’s asset 
base but also served to reinforce its focus on asset building 
and community economic development, given that so many 
americans did not benefit from the wealth generated in the 
heated economy.
Faced with the challenges of making effective grants and 
managing a growing endowment, heron’s board of directors 
understood all too well that the scope of the social problems 
it sought to address required more significant resources than 
its mandated 5% payout. at a regularly scheduled meeting in 
1996, heron’s board reviewed a particular investment man-
ager’s performance for what seemed like hours, leaving little 
time for program matters. This imbalance caused the board to 
step back and evaluate the effectiveness of the foundation. 
after much discussion, the board suggested that because of 
heron’s social mission and tax-exempt status, the foundation 
should be more than essentially a private investment company 
that uses its excess cash flow for charitable purposes. with-
out changes, in the board’s view, there could be very little to 
distinguish the foundation from a conventional investment 
manager.
The board began to view the 5% payout requirement as the 
narrowest expression of the foundation’s philanthropic goals. 
By looking to the other 95% of assets, the “corpus,” the board 
could conceive a broader philanthropic “toolbox” capable of 
greater social impact than grant-making alone.
Spurred by this “tipping point,” the board encouraged staff 
to explore ways in which heron could engage more of its as-
sets through a combination of grant-making and “mission-
related” investment strategies. The board made a deliberate 
decision to find ways to leverage an in-
creasing amount of heron’s resources 
in pursuit of its mission and therefore 
maximize the foundation’s impact in 
low-income communities.
“we recognized that the endow-
ment, left perpetually warehoused, 
was losing the time value of its potential mission impact,” says 
william M. Dietel, the foundation’s chair. “we wanted to be-
have more responsibly as stewards of philanthropic funds.”
 
The Road to Mission-related Investing1
Developing a mission-related investment strategy did not 
happen overnight. heron spent time refining its mission and 
d e te r m i n i ng how it 
could be en- h a n c e d 
through a pro- a c t i v e 
i n v e s t m e n t strategy. 
Initially, there was some 
u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t 
how far and how fast the foundation could move, and there-
fore a reluctance to establish specific mission-related invest-
ment targets. 
By adopting an incremental philosophy, the foundation 
was able to test the concept without making any major mis-
steps. Staff was encouraged to explore opportunities in core 
program areas that would build on existing networks and ex-
pertise, and to share lessons learned along the way.
The First Steps. heron’s first step was to transfer some of 
its actively managed investments into index and enhanced 
index funds. This decision was based on research, unrelated 
to mission investing, that showed no substantial long-term 
active management premium in many core asset classes. In 
addition to reduced investment-management fees, taking this 
step allowed heron to redirect its re-
sources away from managing dozens 
of active investment managers and 
toward building a mission-related 
investment portfolio. Investment 
performance is now as good as when 
the entire portfolio was under active 
management but comes at a lower cost.
Assembling the Skills: Internal Capacity and Investment 
Consultants. The board soon realized the extent to which it 
was challenging conventional thinking. as a result, the board 
expanding Philanthropy: Mission-related 
Investing at the F.B. heron Foundation
Michael Swack, Carsey Institute, University of New Hampshire
The Difference Between Mission Investing and 
Socially Responsible Investing
as defined by FSG Social Impact advisors in its report “Com-
pounding Impact: Mission Investing by U.S. Foundations,” mis-
sion investments are “financial investments made with the inten-
tion of (1) furthering a foundation’s mission and (2) recovering the 
principal invested or earning financial return.” Socially responsible 
investing focuses primarily on (negative) social screening and 
proxy activity in public equities, while mission-related investing is 
a proactive approach in use across asset classes. 
“We recognized that the endowment, 
left perpetually warehoused, was losing 
the time value of its potential mission 
impact,” says William M. Dietel, the 
foundation’s chair.
By adopting an incre-
mental philosophy, the 
foundation was able to test 
the concept without making 
any major missteps.
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decided to build internal management capacity, bringing cer-
tain functions in-house. In addition to encouraging staff to 
take advantage of training opportunities, the board authorized 
a new position, vice president of investments, that would be 
separate from the finance and administration functions. The 
foundation also conducted a search for an investment con-
sulting firm that would appreciate heron’s commitment to 
mission-related investing, eventually retaining evaluation as-
sociates in 2004.
Learning from Foundations and Other Institutional In-
vestors. early on, heron looked to other foundations and in-
stitutional investors (including commercial banks, insurers, 
and public pension funds) for examples of alternative asset 
deployment. heron learned about below-market investments 
from both the Ford and Macarthur Foundations, the earli-
est and largest practitioners of program-related investments. 
heron also found willing partners among large commercial 
banks, which, motivated by the federal Community Reinvest-
ment act, invested in so-called double-bottom-line real estate 
and venture-oriented private equity funds as a way to deliver 
both market-rate financial returns and positive social impact. 
In expanding its role beyond that of traditional grant-maker, 
heron found itself in the company of other types of institu-
tional investors and gained access to potential partners and 
co-investors.
Looking First at Existing Relationships. Through partner-
ships with community-based organizations and financial in-
termediaries, heron has witnessed firsthand the transforma-
tive power of investing in america’s low-income communi-
ties—primarily through home ownership, enterprise develop-
ment, and access to capital. as such, heron determined that its 
grantee pool was a natural place for below-market program-
related investments, which the foundation began to make in 
1997. Because heron understands the management and oper-
ational histories of its grantees, the quality of the underwriting 
is often better than it otherwise might be. today, nearly 75% 
of the foundation’s program-related investments are in groups 
with which heron has or has had an established relationship.
Bridging the Program and Investment Functions. Initial 
discussions with grantees about potential program-related 
investments began with heron’s program staff, who reviewed 
business plans and discussed capital needs, management capa-
bilities, and financial projections, but who also needed guid-
ance in understanding the investment risks involved and how 
best to structure deals to mitigate those risks. as the founda-
tion’s prospecting efforts turned into a pipeline of tangible 
deals, heron began a conscious effort to bridge the program 
and investment functions—a significant departure from how 
typical foundations are organized and staffed. although many 
program staff members appreciated the benefits of having ac-
cess to a new philanthropic tool, others did not feel as com-
fortable with the training, mentoring, and analysis that mak-
ing program-related investments demanded. The result was 
some staff turnover through attrition—not uncommon with 
any significant programmatic change. In replacing staff, her-
on looked for, and attracted, officers who felt comfortable with 
the financial analysis and the investment process. It took time, 
but heron now enjoys a collaborative model, with staff in the 
two functional areas working side by side, and investment staff 
as the “tie breaker.”
Creating a Pipeline of Market-Rate Investment Opportu-
nities. heron’s staff works to build the foundation’s market-
rate portfolio of mission-related investments in three primary 
ways: 
1. Conducting active outreach efforts to identify opportu-
nities within various asset classes; 
2. Creatively adapting traditional investment vehicles and 
asset managers to mission goals; and,
3. Researching and developing new investment vehicles, 
such as the Community Investment Index, a positively 
screened, best-in-class method used to identify publicly 
traded companies with superior records of engaging 
with underserved communities (see box on page 29). 
Leadership for Successful Implementation. to be success-
ful in developing a mission-related investing strategy, a foun-
dation must have the support of its board. while a founda-
tion’s executive and professional staff may lead the board to 
a discussion of mission-related investing, a foundation will 
miss the transformative effects of this shift in strategy with-
out a true and dedicated commitment of its board. The staff, 
then, is responsible for successful implementation. The suc-
cess of mission-related investing relies, in large part, on the 
ability of front-line staff members to think creatively and ana-
lytically about where and how they will identify, recommend 
and underwrite investment opportunities. a chief executive 
officer who encourages openness and flexibility in achieving 
goals will engender confidence in staff members responsible 
for implementation. 
Program-Related Investments
The Internal Revenue Service defines these charitable investments 
using three criteria: (1) the investment’s primary purpose must be 
to advance the foundation’s charitable objectives; (2) neither the 
production of income nor the appreciation of property can be a 
significant purpose; and (3) the funds cannot be used directly or 
indirectly for lobbying or political purposes. Under these criteria, 
all program-related investments are mission-related investments 
because they contribute to the foundation’s mission. however, not 
all mission-related investments are program-related investments 
given that some mission-related investments seek a market return.
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Developing a Mission-related Investment 
Continuum
to sort through the opportunities that mission-related in-
vesting presents, the foundation’s staff developed the “Mis-
sion-related Investment Continuum,” which lays out a set of 
asset classes available to mission-related investors. on the left 
side are below-market investments, including grants and pro-
gram-related investments (private equity, subordinated loans, 
senior loans, and cash). on the right side are mission-related 
investments that generate market rates of return (cash, fixed 
income, public equity, and private equity). The least risky in-
vestments are in the center of the continuum; the risk level 
increases as one moves toward either end. (Guarantees are 
the exception, as their risk level depends on how they are 
structured.)
In developing the continuum, heron staff considered the 
central tenets of traditional investing discipline: asset alloca-
tion, performance benchmarking, and security or manager 
selection. heron’s asset-allocation policy has not changed 
to accommodate its mission-related investing practice. That 
The Community Investment Index
In 2005, with assistance from Innovest Strategic Value advisors, 
heron created a methodology for selecting companies in each in-
dustry in the Standard and Poor’s 900 on the basis of the quality 
of their engagement with low- and moderate income communities 
in the United States. The resulting Community Investment Index 
takes into account corporate strategy, workforce development, 
wealth creation, and corporate philanthropy. 
Past performance of the selected equities looked promising, so 
heron committed a portion of its capital to test the index’s ap-
proach. Managed by State Street Global advisors, the index re-
turned 15.0% in 2006, versus 15.3% for the Standard and Poor’s 900 
and 13.2% for the Domini 400, the most widely used benchmark 
for large-capitalization, socially responsible equity investing. heron 
is creating a commingled investment product that the foundation 
hopes will be attractive to other institutions committed to investing 
in low-income communities. The performance of the index contin-
ues to compare well during the current market turmoil. In 2008, the 
index fell 17.99% in the first three quarters of the year, bringing the 
performance since inception (from november 2005 to September 
2008) to -0.30%. The S&P 900 total return fell 18.89% in the first 
thee quarters of 2008, and the Domini 400 fell 17.20%. In the fall of 
2008, both benchmarks were just about at the same level they were 
three years before.
























strategy is based on total return, as well as liquidity and diver-
sification, which determines how its investments should be dis-
tributed among different types of investment classes and is para-
mount to portfolio performance. Rather, the foundation con-
siders mission-related investing opportunities within the overall 
asset-allocation framework of a well-diversified portfolio. 
heron also has identified appropriate performance bench-
marks by asset class to evaluate relative performance and to 
compare both risk and return for its mission-related invest-
ments versus standard, capital market measures. In choosing 
its mission-related investments, staff consider several vari-
ables, including track record, investment strategy, and market 
opportunity.
heron has taken advantage of mission-related investment 
opportunities across the continuum. In some ways, heron’s 
mission is well suited for such opportunities. Foundations 
that are active in fields of more limited investment and lend-
ing may find it challenging to identify the same breadth of op-
portunities. as such, not all foundations will employ mission-
related investing along the entire continuum; one or two asset 
classes may be sufficient. In these cases, determining where to 
start depends on opportunities presented that are most con-
sistent with mission and investment goals. 
Examples of Below-Market Investments
as its program-related investment portfolio grows, heron has 
found many investment opportunities with different risk and 
return characteristics:
Grants. even though they provide no financial return, 
grants arguably represent the riskiest below-market “asset 
class.” Grant-making helps the foundation establish and de-
velop relationships with organizations on the road to “invest-
ment readiness”;
Cash. Insured deposits in fledgling, rural credit unions 
at below-market rates through intermediaries such as the 
national Federation of Community Development Credit 
Unions;
Senior loans to small business loan funds, such as north 
Carolina-based Self-help Ventures Fund, that invest in busi-
nesses and community facilities in low-income communities;
Subordinated loans to provide credit enhancement for 
affordable housing development, such as the new York City 
acquisition Fund, llC; and
Private-equity venture funds, including new Markets Ven-
ture Capital Companies, Rural Business Investment Compa-
nies, and community-development venture-capital funds.
at nearly $20 million, heron’s program-related investment 
portfolio offers a steady return, measured against a bench-
mark of the long-term inflation rate plus 1%, without any 
losses to date.
Examples of Market-Rate Investments
Cash. The Certificate of Deposit account Registry Service 
(CDaRS), a service of Promontory Interfinancial network 
that allows community banks to “pool” their $100,000 FDIC 
coverage limits to attract larger deposits, allows investors to 
make deposits in certain institutions, including more than a 
dozen community development banks, of up to $30 million 
with full FDIC insurance coverage. heron places $5.8 million 
in deposits in a number of the nation’s 60 community devel-
opment banks and more than 1,000 “low-income designated” 
credit unions, selecting those institutions that have a signifi-
cant portion of their lending activity in asset-building activi-
ties in low-income communities. 
Fixed Income (Bonds). with input from heron, the foun-
dation’s fixed-income manager, Community Capital Manage-
ment, identifies investment-grade, fixed-income securities 
issued by both public and private entities. Mission-related 
bonds range from down-payment assistance for low-income, 
first-time homebuyers in texas to “blight bonds” issued by 
the city of Philadelphia as part of its neighborhood trans-
Using Grants and Program-Related Investments 
Together
The heron Foundation provides both grant support and 
investment to The Reinvestment Fund (tRF), a national 
leader in financing neighborhood revitalization. Grants 
help fund operating costs, loan loss reserves, and policy 
work, including developing tools that help guide invest-
ments. heron’s half-million dollar investment in tRF’s 
capital base is targeted to its small-business lending pro-
gram, which tRF uses to make loans to businesses located 
in and hiring from low-income communities. In different 
ways, heron’s grants and program-related investments 
sustain tRF by helping meet its need for capital while 
also supporting heron’s program and mission goals.
Heron has identified appropriate performance 
benchmarks by asset class to evaluate relative 
performance and to compare both risk and re-
turn for its mission-related investments versus 
standard. 
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formation Initiative. Some of the securities in heron’s fixed-
income portfolio are backed by pools of loans originated by 
community-based nonprofit organizations and aggregated 
by the Community Reinvestment Fund. Community Capital 
Management has also worked with the Small Business ad-
ministration to add information to loan descriptions about 
borrowers’ location in low- and moderate-income census 
tracts and number of employees. This information helps to 
develop pools that more closely fit heron’s mission. heron’s 
mission-related fixed-income portfolio stands at $21 million 
and has outperformed its benchmark, the lehman Brothers 
aggregate, since inception. 
Public Equity. heron uses its Community Investment In-
dex to invest in publicly traded equities (see box on page 29).
Private Equity. heron’s private equity is focused on real 
estate, such as commercial properties in inner-city commu-
nities, and later-stage venture financing. It currently has $16 
million in outstanding market-rate private equity commit-
ments, measuring their performance against a benchmark of 
the Russell 3000 plus 3%. The real estate portfolio is generat-
ing net returns ranging from the low to the upper teens, and 
venture funds are producing net returns on realized invest-
ments of more than 20%.
Managing the Portfolio
heron pays close attention to several factors to fulfill its fidu-
ciary duty. 
Asset Allocation. heron’s current asset allocation, estab-
lished by the board, is approxi-
mately 65% in equities, 25% in 
fixed-income securities, and 
10% in alternative investments, 
such as private equity. This allo-
cation governs all investing, both 
traditional and mission-related.
Investment Fees. with nearly one-half of its investment 
portfolio in index and enhanced index investments, heron’s 
investment management fees were 34 basis points in 2006. 
This is below the mean of other private foundations in widely 
known investment surveys.
Underwriting and Due Diligence. outside third-party 
consultants assist both program officers reviewing below-
market, mission-related transactions and investment staff 
underwriting market-rate, mission-related investments. This 
“second pair of eyes” provides heron with an independent, 
arm’s-length review that supplements, but does not supplant, 
staff ’s judgment.
Monitoring. heron monitors all aspects of its portfolio, 
with staff meeting quarterly and third-party monitoring re-
ports by experts in each asset class. Monitoring efforts have 
revealed a number of issues that investees face, such as lead-
ership transitions, fundraising disappointments and market 
changes that sometimes lead to deteriorating financial health. 
In most cases, heron has taken steps to stay with its investees 
through tough times.
The Results: Better-than-Average Portfolio 
Performance
Contrary to the perception held by many other foundation 
trustees and staff that there is a trade-off between financial 
return and social impact, heron’s experience during the last 
10 years demonstrates that competitive investment returns 
are possible, even when incorporating mission-related in-
vestments into an overall portfolio and asset allocation. as 
of December 31, 2007, heron’s total fund performance was 
in the second quartile of the Mellon all-Foundation total 
Fund Universe on both a trailing three-year and five-year ba-
sis, with 20% of assets in market-rate mission-related invest-
ments; 6% in below-market, program-related investments; 
and 3% in grants. 
today’s mission-related investing environment is very dif-
ferent from the one heron encountered in 1996. now, there 
are mission-related investment vehicles in virtually every as-
set class. as Vice President of Investments luther M. Ragin, 
Jr., says, “That is really the story here. while each foundation 
will have to work at visualiz-
ing its own mission through 
an investment strategy, there 
is no need to reinvent the 
wheel.”
The F.B. heron Founda-
tion has moved well beyond 
the tipping point toward a fully diversified, mission-related 
investing practice. Indeed, heron continues to expand its vi-
sion and investment horizons, using its broad experience in 
working with community-based organizations to bring the 
full weight of its resources, and those of other investors, to 
bear on its mission. no longer does heron view low-income 
people and neighborhoods merely as candidates for grant 
funding. It views them as good investments.
1 a full copy of the case study is available at www.fbheron.org/snhu_her-
on_casestudy.pdf.
No longer does Heron view low-income peo-
ple and neighborhoods merely as candidates 
for grant funding. It views them as good invest-
ments.
34
Pension funds can earn attractive risk-adjusted rates of return on targeted private equity investments in underserved capital markets. targeted investing is 
designed to achieve both a financial and social return. This 
article details the experience of the CalPeRS pension fund 
with targeted equity investment.
The California Public employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPeRS) is the largest U.S. public pension fund.1 Since the 
early 1930s, CalPeRS has provided pension benefits to state, 
public school, and local public agency employees, retirees, 
and their families. The population of workers and retirees 
served by CalPeRS since the 1930s has grown over a hundred 
times, from 14,000 state employees in 1933 to 1.5 million ac-
tive workers and retirees in 2008. assets under management 
have expanded from $2.6 million in 1933 to approximately 
$250 billion today, an increase of nearly one hundred thou-
sand times. Most of the income—and source of funds for pay-
ing benefits—comes from investment rather than member 
and employer contributions. approximately three of every 
four dollars paid in retirement benefits come from invest-
ment earnings.2 
CalPERS Investment Policy
Given the importance of investment earnings, CalPeRS 
must pay close attention to its returns. CalPeRS is led by a 
13-member Board of administration, which, as its invest-
ment committee, also oversees the management of CalPeRS 
assets. CalPeRS employs a 180-member internal investment 
organization plus thousands of outside managers and advi-
sors.3 The starting point for successful returns on investment 
is asset allocation—strategically diversifying among stocks, 
bonds, cash and other categories of assets. This captures the 
greatest return at the least overall risk to market volatility. 
Many factors, including liabilities, benefit payments, operat-
ing expenses, and employer and member contributions, are 
considered when determining the appropriate asset alloca-
tion mix.4 
CalPeRS follows a strategic asset allocation policy that de-
termines the percentage of funds to be invested in each asset 
class. Policy targets are typically pursued over several years 
through market declines and dollar cost averaging. The major 
asset classes are global equities (targeted at 66%, including a 
6% target for alternative investments, which includes private 
equity and other vehicles), global fixed income (targeted at 
26%), real estate (targeted at 8%), and the rest in inflation-
linked assets and cash equivalents. Consistent with its guiding 
principles, CalPeRS manages its assets through “the highest 
quality, secure and innovative programs” designed to obtain 
“the highest return on our investment portfolio to survive, 
prosper and grow in a safe and prudent manner.” 
Alternative Investments and the California 
Initiative
Unlike a private foundation, a public pension fund may not 
make below-market investments. Fiduciary duty requires 
public-sector pension funds 
to put finan- cial obligations 
at the fore- front of their 
decision mak- ing. however, 
these funds also have a 
vested inter- est in ensuring 
economically healthy com-
munities that in turn sup-
port employer contributions 
to the fund.5 while keeping 
with the prin- ciples of sound 
financial man- agement, a 
public pension fund such as 
CalPeRS may target a portion 
of its investments within certain geographies and under-
served markets. The California Initiative is one of CalPeRS’ 
innovative programs within the alternative investments asset 
class. It seeks investment opportunities in California that of-
fer attractive, risk-adjusted returns, commensurate with their 
asset class.6 
The CalPeRS alternative Investment Management (aIM) 
team, directed by the investment committee, launched the 
CalPeRS California Initiative in 2001. The California Initia-
tive aims to invest private equity in “traditionally underserved 
markets primarily, but not exclusively, located in California,” 
by finding and investing in opportunities that other sources 
Public Pension Funds and targeted Private equity 
Investment: The CalPeRS California Initiative
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of investment capital may have bypassed. 
The primary objective of the California Initiative is to gen-
erate attractive financial returns, meeting or exceeding pri-
vate equity benchmarks.7 early results are positive. as of Sep-
tember 30, 2007, the initiative reported a net 18.2% internal 
rate of return since its inception.8 as an ancillary benefit, the 
California Initiative seeks to have a meaningful impact on the 
economic landscape of California’s underserved markets. 
The California Initiative has been implemented in two 
phases. Phase I was approved in May 2001 and consists of a 
capital commitment of $475 million to nine private equity 
funds and one fund-of-funds (see diagram on page 34). The 
fund-of-funds, the Banc of america California Community 
Venture Fund (BaCCVF), is managed by Banc of america 
Capital access Funds (BaCaF), and its investment objectives 
parallel those of the California Initiative. In october 2006, 
CalPeRS announced a second allocation, a $500 million capi-
tal commitment to be managed by hamilton lane, a leading 
private equity investment manager. CalPeRS and hamilton 
lane established an investment vehicle known as the Golden 
State Investment Fund (GSIF), which seeks to invest in both 
partnerships and direct co-investments primarily located in 
California. (The second phase allocation was later increased 
to $550 million.) The Golden State Investment Fund managed 
by hamilton lane includes as partners DFJ Frontier, levine 
leichtman Capital, Pacific Community Ventures, and Rlh 
Investors. 
By September 30, 2007, the California Initiative had 
invested in 217 companies and GSIF had invested in nine 
companies.10 This portfolio is expected to grow significant-
ly. among the 197 Phase I company investments, 115 were 
made through the nine private equity funds while the re-
maining 82 were made through 13 funds in the BaCCVF. 
Banc of america expects its funds to ultimately invest in 150 
to 175 companies.
What Are Underserved 
Markets?
Source: Pacific Community Ventures. 
(2007). CalPERS California Initiative: Impact-
ing California’s Underserved Communities 
2007. San Francisco, Ca: Pacific Community 
Ventures.
Underserved markets are less efficient 
and have the potential to provide superior 
investment performance. The three criteria 
for designating a market as underserved 
are: 1) companies located in areas where 
access to institutional equity capital is lim-
ited, 2) companies that employ workers 
who reside in economically disadvantaged 
areas, and 3) companies with female or mi-
nority management.
Areas with limited access to equity
Between 2001 and 2007, about three-quar-
ters of all California companies receiving 
private equity investment were concentrated 
in just 153 of the state’s 1,700+ zip codes, and 
they received more than nine-tenths of all the 
private equity dollars invested in the state. In 
the United States as a whole, nearly one-half 
of all companies receiving private equity in-
vestment are located in 774 postal codes, and 
they receive four-fifths of all dollars invested 
in private equity. For the purposes of the 
California Initiative, companies based out-
side these 774 zip codes are “in areas where 
access to institutional equity capital has tra-
ditionally been limited.” about one-half of 
California Initiative companies (California-
based and nationwide) were headquartered 
outside the areas that traditional investment 
targets. 
areas traditionally overlooked by equity 
capital investment can offer some unique 
advantages. In urban areas, underfunded 
companies are often near centrally located 
business and transportation hubs. They can 
also benefit from large and diverse labor 
pools and access to real estate, local con-
sumer demand, and government incentives. 
Underserved rural areas offer strategic op-
portunities, including inexpensively priced 
land and office space, available workers, 
lower living costs, government incentives, 
and potential for development of technol-
ogy and infrastructure.9 
Economically disadvantaged areas
economically disadvantaged areas are 
low-to-moderate income (lMI) census 
tracts. More than 40% of the employees 
at California Initiative portfolio companies 
live in areas composed predominantly of 
lMI census tracts, and more than 80% of 
California Initiative portfolio company em-
ployees live in areas that overlap with lMI 
census tracts. although these latter em-
ployees might not reside in lower-income 
communities, they live next to them and 
are in a position to contribute economi-
cally to the lMI community. as a frame of 
reference, 35% of all employed americans 
and 38% of all employed Californians live 
in lMI census tracts.
Female or minority management
The third criterion of underserved mar-
kets is companies whose officers or key man-
agers are women or minorities. California 
Initiative companies report a total of 344 
officers. of these officers, 13% are women, 
3% are hispanic or latino, 5% are african 
american, and 6% are asian/Pacific Islander. 
among the companies’ 1,668 reported key 
managers, the distribution of women and 
minorities is mostly greater or about the 
same as among officers. This compares fa-
vorably with U.S. businesses with more than 
$1 million in annual revenue (as is typical 
of companies receiving institutional equity 
capital investment). of these, approximately 
10% are owned by women, 2% are owned by 
hispanics, less than 1% is owned by african 





Companies in the California Initiative portfolio employ more 
than 75,000 workers across the United States. two companies 
experienced a sharp decline in jobs (3,445 jobs lost), causing 
overall job growth in the portfolio to lag national trends. not 
counting those two companies, however, the job growth na-
tionally among companies in the first phase of the California 
Initiative was 18%, and the job growth in California was 31%. 
This compares with general U.S. and California employment 
growth of 8% between June 2000 and June 2007.
Job Quality
California Initiative companies generally compare equally or 
favorably to state and national trends in employee benefits 
offered. They compare particularly well in offering medical 
coverage and retirement plans, with nearly all the companies 
offering medical coverage (versus about 60% nationwide) and 
approximately four in five companies offering a retirement 
plan (versus one-half of companies nationwide). 
Supplier Relationships 
California Initiative companies also support California em-
ployment by doing business with other companies in the state. 
In total, Phase I companies have maintained active relation-
ships with more than 48,000 suppliers. approximately 10,000 
of these suppliers are located in California. The four GSIF 
companies that provided data for the ancillary benefits report 
maintain more than 4,700 active supplier relationships, 24% 
of which are with California companies. two of the four GSIF 
companies have programs in place to track minority supplier 
relationships, which total 174 suppliers or 5% of their total 
supplier base.
Lessons Learned
Getting Started in Targeted Investing
as is the case in foundations (see heron MRI article, p. 27), 
engaging in targeted investment at a public pension fund 
usually requires a board-level champion to build support 
among board members and board consultants.11 once the 
board agrees to consider a targeted investment, pension fund 
internal staff typically commission an expert study of these 
investment opportunities. Generally staff chooses an outside 
expert with whom they are comfortable. The study can take as 
long as one year to complete. During this time, both staff and 
board increase their comfort levels with targeted investing. 
CalPeRS hired Mckinsey and Co. to analyze targeted invest-
ment programs with staff. “They scoured etI [economically 
targeted investment] programs to see what worked and what 
didn’t work,” reports Joncarlo Mark, Senior Portfolio Man-
ager of the CalPeRS alternative Investment Management 
Program, in a personal interview in June 2008. 
The report guides the board in choosing the asset class and 
level of investment most appropriate for targeted investment 
Chart 3: California Initiative Partners
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given their current asset allocation. often staff are asked to 
issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) or Request for Informa-
tion (RFI) from external money managers in the chosen 
asset class. Board and staff will look for proposals from top 
quartile performers with a track record of successful targeted 
investments. CalPeRS spent significant time marketing the 
program, and generated much interest from external money 
managers, receiving 67 proposals. “we’re lucky,” says Mark. 
“California is a pretty big market with lots of underserved 
markets. You want to be diversified, and the size was mean-
ingful.”
Best practice in targeted investment
Pension funds cannot be market makers. Private 
equity is one part of the investment solution for underserved 
markets. as Mark says, “The big takeaway is that institutional 
private equity is just a piece of the pie.” Many opportunities 
may not meet private equity return expectations. In the case 
of severely blighted areas, for example, pension funds cannot 
act as market makers. They can begin to invest and provide 
liquidity after more appropriate government or nonprofit ac-
tors have begun making subsidized investments without ex-
pectation of return and transformed the nature of the target 
area. Mark adds, “not every company wants or needs private 
equity… a lot of community development or SBa money is a 
lot less expensive than what’s available in the regular market.”
It is better to use geographic rather than social 
targeting. Boards should set broad geographic targets for 
both internal staff and external money mangers. when in-
vestment fund managers re-
ceive a broad framework for 
i n v e s t m e n t selection, with 
a preference, for example, to 
the pension fund’s own state 
or to low- and middle-income 
areas, they can select the best 
investments for the fund in that geography. “They need not 
pay a lot of attention to social considerations,” tessa hebb, 
a senior research associate at the University of oxford, ex-
plained in an interview in april 2008, “because by extension 
investments in companies will have positive impacts in their 
locations in terms of job creation, tax base enlargement, real 
estate renewal and revitalization.” Investments are more likely 
to be successful when the social impacts are not dictated. So-
cial goals are best achieved by partnering with a local non-
profit organization whose purpose is to achieve social out-
comes. 
A broad, attractive mandate can attract other 
investors and leverage an institution’s invest-
ment. what the California Initiative found, reports Mark, is 
that although less than half of the first phase investment of 
$500 million went to California companies, the fund man-
agers raised an additional $700 million from other investors 
for a total of $1.2 billion – and when half of that pot goes to 
investments in California, it is equivalent to the entire CalP-
eRS investment having gone to California. “This is a very im-
portant consideration,” says Mark. “Foundation or program 
capital is only a sliver of what is available. with a broad man-
date that allows fund managers to make money, you may only 
be achieving 50% targeting, but you can attract ten times as 
much investment.” and, say kruzel and colleagues in a recent 
report, “having other investors with ‘skin-in-the-game’ not 
only serves to multiply the impacts of an institution’s capital, 
but also helps to validate the original investment thesis.”12 
Measure success in terms of risk-adjusted rates 
of return. “targeted programs have a tremendous politi-
cal risk,” says hebb. “If an investment is unsuccessful, it can 
tarnish the whole program.” The mid-to-late 1980s and 1990s 
saw a trend toward “economically targeted investing” direct-
ed toward social impact. Investments were meant to be mar-
ket-rate, but in reality ancillary benefits took precedence, and 
business plans were not as sound as they should have been. as 
A more targeted investment program 
Joncarlo Mark of the CalPeRS alternative Investment Manage-
ment Program explains that starting with a broad mandate in 
Phase I of the California Initiative allowed them to attract and 
find good managers, whom they will continue to use. “If we 
had been too heavy-handed,” he says, by limiting investments 
to California, “we couldn’t have found them.” The problem, 
however, is that although 70% of the companies that received 
funding in the first phase are located in California, only 40% of 
the invested dollars went to California. 
In Phase II, one-half of the investment capital will go to Cali-
fornia-based funds, and one-half as direct co-investments into 
California companies. “This time around, we are going to make 
sure we get California on a dollar basis,” says Mark. The initia-
tive not only hopes that managers invest in the state, but it 
is directly investing or driving at least one-half of the funds 
to the California market, without sacrificing desired returns. 
“hamilton lane is still using underwriting criteria in evaluating 
deals and looking to generate a 20% return,” says Mark. “They 
have a dedicated team of people talking to people in the com-
munity and potential investment partners, promoting what 
we are doing and finding investment opportunities. They are 
co-investing with any manager who has a deal in the pipeline 
that meets the criteria for underserved markets and returns. 
we are seeing some pretty interesting deals.”
Investments are 
more likely to be  
successful when the 
social impacts are  
not dictated.
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a result, the targeted number of jobs did not materialize, and 
the failure caused a backlash. as kruzel and colleagues note, 
“regardless of the type of mandate considered, it is paramount 
that at the core of the program, performance is the primary 
driver for investment. Committed capital should onlY be 
deployed to investments within the targeted mandate that can 
demonstrate a return commensurate with the [investment] 
risks…”13 Mark agrees, emphasizing, “First and foremost the 
goal is to generate acceptable returns commensurate with the 
invested asset class.”
Avoid interference in investment selection. 
“one of the biggest challenges facing targeted programs is 
the natural tendency for political considerations to find a way 
into the investment decision process,” according to kruzel 
and colleagues.14 In selecting fund managers, boards should 
choose top-quartile investment vehicles and look at track re-
cords and relationships, but they should refrain from picking 
investments. Using external money managers insulates pen-
sion funds from charges of political interference in invest-
ment selection. as kruzel and colleagues advise, “allowing 
an outside party to have a role in the decision making process 
will help put in place a ‘firewall’ against political influence.”15 
A fund-of-funds structure allows larger in-
vestments. Many pension funds and other institutional 
investors have large sums of money to invest—much more 
than most companies or even single funds can handle, par-
ticularly without running up against the pension funds’ limits 
on being too large or significant an investor. a fund-of-funds 
structure with an external manager allows the project to in-
vest large sums of money, to be placed in smaller amounts in 
the funds and from there into companies. 
This approach, however, may lead to significant costs: gen-
erally fund managers take a commission on the profits (20% 
is typical) and the manager of a fund-of-funds may take an 
additional 5% to 10%. kruzel and colleagues find that using 
a fund-of-funds structure “has historically been the model 
for starting a targeted program,” but that seasoned private 
equity and venture capital investors may prefer using a co-
investment model.16 In fact, the second phase of the CalPeRS 
California Initiative, the Golden State Investment Fund, uses 
a hybrid investment vehicle that is half direct co-investment 
in companies and half investing in funds. 
Funds-of-funds and pooled funds allow diver-
sification and reduce risk. Fund-of-funds vehicles 
can provide diversification for pension fund investors. Pen-
sion funds can also diversify targeted investment and reduce 
risk by placing money in commingled, pooled funds with 
reciprocal investment capability. For example, a state pen-
sion fund with $100 million in a large multistate fund could 
request that the fund look for an equivalent $100 million in-
vestment in opportunities in its own state. The Golden State 
Investment Fund managed by hamilton lane carefully con-
structs the direct co-investment half of the portfolio to pro-
vide diversification in terms of vintage year, strategy (such 
as venture, expansion, or buyout), region, and sector, from 
aerospace to bakeries. “effectively, it gives us more control,” 
says Mark.
Develop appropriate compensation to increase 
buy-in. Programs must create appropriate compensation 
packages for internal money managers of targeted investment 
portfolios, particularly if investments are relatively small, re-
quiring more work and generating less revenue. For example, 
if a portfolio is doing well, managers might receive a bonus to 
their annual salary. 
Outreach and promotion can improve the in-
vestment environment. CalPeRS has been an invest-
ment leader in underserved markets. other institutions have 
been slow to adopt such strategies. CalPeRS was also one of 
the few pension funds to target private equity in addition to 
real estate or fixed income. now significantly more institu-
tional capital is being placed in the private equity asset class. 
In addition, entrepreneurs in underserved markets have 
come to more readily accept private equity. “It’s hard to give 
up control to outside parties,” says Mark, “but as a result of all 
the etI programs and the kind of outreach CalPeRS and its 
partners have done, there is an improved acceptance among 
entrepreneurs in underserved markets of accepting third par-
ty money.” Minority entrepreneurs are also seeing the advent 
of new money managed by minority investors.
Sensitivity to emerging trends provides early 
mover advantage in rapidly shifting markets. 
as Mark says, CalPeRS has demonstrated that when craft-
ed carefully, innovative strategies can generate returns that 
would please any fiduciary. he points to a second success 
story: an environmental technology program that invests in 
clean air, water, and energy. “Sometimes there’s good reason 
that money isn’t flowing into a particular strategy,” says Mark, 
“but sometimes you can be a contrarian and see a demand 
and readiness among management teams and entrepreneurs, 
but an absence of capital. There’s risk in investing where there 
are not a lot of people competing with you, but it provides an 
environment for potentially good investment returns.”
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1 Information for this article was drawn from the CalPeRS website (www.
calpers.ca.gov) as well as the works cited in the following endnotes. 
2 applied Research Center. (2007). The economic Impacts of CalPeRS In-
vestments on the California economy. Sacramento, Ca: applied Research 
Center, California State University. available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/
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3 Mark, J. (2007). CalPeRS alternative Investment Management (aIM) 
Program: Investing in California’s Underserved Markets. Inner City eco-
nomic Forum: 5th annual Summit, october 18. Philadelphia, Pa.
4 applied Research Center (2007). See note 2, above.
5 hebb, t. (2006). Pension Funds and Urban Revitalization: California Case 
Study a: Private equity: CalPeRS’ California Initiative. Cambridge, Ma: la-
bor & worklife Program, harvard law School.
6 Pacific Community Ventures. (2007). CalPeRS California Initiative: Im-
pacting California’s Underserved Communities 2007. San Francisco, Ca: 
Pacific Community Ventures.
7 The aIM team generally uses as its standard the Venture economics bench-
mark for private equity—see http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/in-
vestments/assets/equities/aim/programoverview.xml for more on the aIM 
performance comparisons and investment policy.
8 Pacific Community Ventures and Golden State Investment Fund. (2008). 
California Initiative Update. February. available at http://www.calpers.
ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/invest-corp/item06a-01.pdf.
9 CalPeRS. (2008). “Press Release: CalPeRS California Initiative Program 
Deploys Private equity Capital to overlooked Markets.” CalPeRS office of 
Public affairs: Sacramento, Ca. February 19. available at http://www.calp-
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10 Pacific Community Ventures and Golden State Investment Fund (2008). 
See note 8, above.
11 This section is based on work by tessa hebb and Joncarlo Mark, cited 
above, and also draws on kruzel, J. (2008). targeted alternative Investment 
Programs:Common Best Practices Identified for the Creation and Imple-
mentation of targeted Programs by limited Partners. toronto, on: task 
Force on targeted alternative Investment Programs, IlPa. Presented to 
the IlPa RBS Committee. Institutional limited Partners is a 200-member 
not-for-profit association serving limited partner investors such as public 
pensions, corporate pensions, endowments, foundations, family offices, and 
insurance companies in the global private equity industry.
12 J. kruzel et al., (2008), p. 10.
13 Ibid., p.10.
14 Ibid., p. 12.
15 Ibid., p. 13.
16 Ibid., p. 11.
The last word
“It feels good to meet both your fiduciary obligation and your 
double bottom line.” –Joncarlo Mark
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today roughly 3.5 million homeowners live in an es-timated 50,000 manufactured home communities in the United States. Generally somebody else, usually 
an investor landlord, owns the land on which their homes 
sit and charges residents a monthly fee or lot rent. This rela-
tionship leads to insecurity for the homeowners; they worry 
about the land being sold or the rents rising quickly. as a pub-
lic policy issue, the insecurity of these communities threatens 
the availability of affordable housing. Manufactured home 
communities represent a sizable source of affordable housing 
for low- and moderate-income people in most rural states. 
as an example, roughly 4% of new hampshire’s 1.2 million 
people live in manufactured home communities.
Most of the families living in manufactured home com-
munities want control and the opportunity that home- and 
land-ownership represents. however, their wishes are not of-
ten realized owing to a lack of systematic local technical sup-
port and appropriate financing when communities are put 
up for sale. less than helpful public policies present another 
barrier: most states lack a right-to-purchase statute giving 
residents the right of first refusal when an owner wants to sell 
the land, and in general the policy environment favors single-
family residences. For a complete list of state “opportunity to 
purchase” policies, see the national Consumer law Center 
website, www.nclc.org. 
The New Hampshire Experience: Financing, 
Technical Assistance, and Public Policy
Since 1983, the nonprofit organization new hampshire Com-
munity loan Fund (nhClF) has been providing training, 
technical assistance, and financing to help homeowners trans-
form their communities into resident-owned cooperative as-
sociations. In 1984, the nhClF made its first loan, $43,000 
to 13 families in Meredith, new hampshire. The residents 
purchased their community with the funds to avoid the risk 
of community closure and eviction due to change of use. In 
the quarter-century since then, the loan Fund has made $40 
million in loans and leveraged another $100 million in bank 
debt for resident acquisitions. The loan Fund and bank lend-
ers have not experienced any charge-offs or foreclosures.
Manufactured home Communities – ROC USa
Paul Bradley, President, ROC USA
What is a Manufactured Home?
Source: reprinted with permission from lance George and Mila-
na Barr, Moving Home: Manufactured Housing in Rural America. 
washington, DC: housing assistance Council, 2005. 
Manufactured Home. a manufactured home is a factory-
built housing unit designed to meet the federal Manufactured 
home Construction and Safety Standards, also known as the 
hUD Code. a manufactured home has a chassis that supports the 
structural integrity of the unit and is designed to be transported 
to a building site. Factory-built units that meet the hUD Code 
and were constructed after the code took effect on June 15, 1976 
are classified as manufactured homes.
Mobile Home. Factory-built units constructed on a chassis 
and completed before June 15, 1976, are generally classified as 
mobile homes.
Trailer. trailers are technically recreational vehicles that do 
not conform to local building or hUD Code standards. although 
considered antiquated and often derogatory, the term trailer is 
still colloquially used when referring to manufactured or mobile 
homes.
Modular Home. Modular homes are factory-built to meet 
the state, local, or regional codes where the homes will be located. 
Under this process, modules are assembled in three dimensions at 
a factory. The modules are then towed to the building site and put 
together in a variety of ways to construct the unit.
What is a Manufactured Home 
Community?
Manufactured Home Community. a manufactured home 
community, or “mobile home park,” is generally defined by state 
jurisdiction as a single parcel of land on which sit two or more 
manufactured homes. In most instances, manufactured home 
communities are owned by investor landlords, and the homes are 
owned by their occupants. The rental relationship between com-
munity owner and homeowners is generally a matter of state law 
or local ordinance and generally is not incorporated in a lease.
Resident-owned community. Resident ownership refers 
to community ownership by the homeowners. In most instances, 
homeowners form a corporation (or cooperative) to acquire the 
community as a whole and operate it for the benefit of the home-
owners. Support for this model of ownership exists because it also 
helps the broader community preserve an affordable community. 
homeowners can also achieve resident ownership through sub-
division, although local zoning regulations generally have posed a 
significant barrier to sub-dividing existing communities.
Most of the families living in manufactured 
home communities want control and the opportu-
nity that home- and land-ownership represents.
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homeowners in “for sale” manufactured home communi-
ties face two barriers to resident ownership. They need access 
to timely and appropriate financing, and they need access to 
timely and expert technical assistance for pre-purchase and 
post-purchase support. 
Financing
Below is a typical financing package in new hampshire for a 
60-unit park with $1.3 million in development costs (includ-
ing purchase price, improvements, and other closing costs):
Bank (8.25% for 30 years) — $800,000
nhClF (8.25% for 30 years) — $485,000
Resident equity — $15,000 (60 x $250 per share)
total Financing — $1,300,000
The low share price paid by individual members results in 
a down payment for the cooperative’s purchase of the manu-
factured home community. The financial gap between what 
residents can raise through the proceeds of selling member-
ship shares and the 75% to 80% loan-to-value ratio that a 
bank will provide is filled by the loan Fund in a senior/sub-
ordinate debt package.
Private banks followed the lead taken by the new hamp-
shire Community loan Fund and the new hampshire hous-
ing Finance authority, a quasi-public agency, in entering this 
market. Banks gained confidence that this was a legitimate 
and safe line of business. These deals are a stretch for bankers 
owing to ostensible challenges such as the lack of fixed leader-
ship, no personal guarantees, little “cash” equity, likely history 
of disinvestment in the property, a democratically controlled 
borrower, and a new line of business for the borrower. how-
ever, since 1988, banks have reliably provided first mortgage 
financing for cooperative purchases and now compete for 
deals.
Training
The loan Fund has also evolved into a specialty technical as-
sistance provider because, in addition to capital, community 
groups need customized information and training at the right 
time and place to reach their goals. Many people would not 
even begin to organize, believing ownership impossible. The 
loan Fund, through its Cooperative assistance team, helps 
homeowners in new hampshire manufactured home com-
munities navigate the process of cooperative conversion by:
•	 Assisting	homeowners	 in	organizing	 as	 a	 cooperative	
and establishing a board of directors and committees;
•	 Helping	 to	 arrange	financing	or	 lending	 funds	 to	 the	
resident-owned cooperative for predevelopment work, 
deposit financing, purchase and rehab; and
•	 Providing	ongoing	technical	support	and	training.
The loan Fund is committed to developing effective coop-
erative management systems and practices in every commu-
nity by providing training and support to directors and mem-
bers. a frontline staff of five full-time specialists in finance, 
infrastructure, and organizational development provides 
one-on-one and group technical assistance and training. They 
also generate a statewide newsletter, run a leadership training 
program, and convene a biannual conference.
Policy
In new hampshire, a partnership between tenant activists 
and community economic development practitioners has re-
sulted in protective regulations for owners of manufactured 
homes in manufactured home communities and a sense that 
remaking the industry based on resident ownership is pos-
sible. In 1988, the loan Fund joined the Mobile homeowners 
and tenants’ association (Mota) to argue for an “opportu-
nity to purchase law” for residents. The new hampshire leg-
islature adopted the law that gives residents in manufactured 
home communities 60 days’ notice and an opportunity to 
negotiate in good faith to acquire the community when the 
investor puts the property up for sale or accepts an offer to 
sell it. Under the law, the investor is allowed to sell for fair 
market value and in a timely manner, while the residents gain 
the potential benefits of landownership through their right to 
purchase. The law’s passage was a virtual endorsement for res-
ident-ownership, an acknowledgment at the time that owning 
a home on rented land was simply bad public policy.
also, under new hampshire law, once installed on site, a 
manufactured home is defined as real estate rather than as 
personal property. It is taxed, sold, and recorded as real estate. 
home loans are secured by mortgages, eliminating the reposses-
sion risk that plagues consumers in states where manufactured 
homes are treated and financed as personal property. treating 
manufactured homes as real estate is also key to attracting con-
ventional residential lenders, who can provide far more favor-
able financing terms than personal property lenders.
Finally, the state’s co-op statute is easy to use and ensures 
long-term affordability and security. The statute is rooted in a 
democratic “one member/one vote” principle. Members elect 
directors and officers at prescribed annual meetings, and the 
Homeowners in “for sale” manufactured home 
communities need access to timely and appropri-
ate financing, and they need access to timely and 
expert technical assistance.
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assets of the corporation cannot be sold without a member-
ship vote. were the co-op to sell its park, the proceeds beyond 
each member’s share and home value would be turned over to 
a 501(c)3 nonprofit corporation.
The Benefits of New Hampshire’s Cooperative 
Model
There are currently 88 resident-owned communities in new 
hampshire, representing approximately a 20% market share 
of all manufactured communities and nearly 5,000 units. 
experience in new hampshire has shown that when 
homeowners come together to convert their manufactured 
home community to resident-owned, they achieve financial 
independence and economic security, and their pride in their 
neighborhood and community increases. The Carsey Insti-
tute at the University of new hampshire recently documented 
the financial benefits of resident ownership, including lower 
monthly site fees over time, better home price appreciation, 
and faster home sales.1
•	 Homeowners	 in	 resident-owned	communities	pay,	on	
average, $40 less per month after five years of ownership 
than homeowners in investor-owned communities.
•	 Residents	 of	 resident-owned	 communities	 are	 nearly	
twice as likely as residents of investor-owned commu-
nities to have a home mortgage, and that mortgage is 
significantly more likely to be fixed-rate.
•	 These	homeowners	see	their	assets	appreciating	because	
of lower monthly fees and improved financing options 
(the availability of loans increases the effective demand 
for housing, and this contributes to greater appreciation 
in housing values), evidenced by a 12% price per square 
foot margin over homes sold in investor-owned com-
munities.
•	 These	 homeowners	 are	 safe	 from	 community	 closure	
and change-of-use evictions.
•	 These	 homeowners	 are	 maintaining	 and	 improving	
their water, septic, and road systems because revenues 
are used locally, not exported as profits.
About ROC USA
The experience and expertise developed in new hampshire 
over nearly a quarter-century is being extended to the nation 
through a new organization, RoC USa™, llC. In 2004, the 
loan Fund began training other nonprofit organizations in 
the United States on resident ownership, and in 2006 began 
infusing RoC USa with intellectual capital and logistical 
support. 
Chart 4: RoC USa























The loan Fund and the Corporation for enterprise Devel-
opment (CFeD), a washington-based nonprofit organization 
focused on market and policy-based asset-building strate-
gies, became the 
founding mem-
bers of RoC 
USa in Decem-
ber of 2007. 
nCB Capital Impact later joined as a third member. Through 
those members and the Ford Foundation and Fannie Mae, 
RoC USa has more than $8 million in seed funding.
The organization, headed by Paul Bradley and Cheryl Ses-
sions, two of the most experienced leaders in resident owner-
ship, launched in May 2008, and it is now 
a free-standing, incorporated, 501(c)3 
with its own staff and governance struc-
tures. Governing RoC USa is a board of 
directors, who are currently drawn from 
the llC members and will expand to include homeowners, 
nonprofit Certified technical assistance Providers, and other 
industry experts.
as in new hampshire, the strategy to change the manufac-
tured home market will be three-pronged, covering training 
and technical assistance, financing, and public policy advoca-
cy. RoC USa will provide technical assistance and financing 
through two subsidiary branches: RoC USa network and 
RoC USa Capital. 
The RoC USa network will provide the training and tech-
nical assistance that helps homeowners buy their community. 
RoC USa Certified technical assistance Providers (CtaPs) 
are local and regional nonprofit organizations dedicated to 
providing high-quality and timely services to homeowner 
groups when their communities are for sale. RoC USa has 
certified and trained an initial group of local technical as-
sistance providers who will work directly with homeowners 
and communities on pre-purchase and post-purchase techni-
cal and organizational needs. nine CtaPs provide services 
to manufactured home communities in 28 states (see box on 
page 42).
RoC USa Capital will originate high loan-to-value com-
munity purchase loans, holding subordinate pieces and sell-
ing senior notes to established community development and 
private lenders. RoC USa will use its competitive advantages 
of offering qualified technical assistance, high loan-to-value 
lending, deep experience, and knowledge of how to develop 
the manufactured home market to achieve its goals:




Its mission of making quality resident ownership viable na-
tionwide involves more than just work-
ing with residents of investor-owned 
parks. a comprehensive homeowner-
oriented manufactured housing sector 
strategy also involves manufacturers 
who produce quality homes and responsible intermediaries 
who distribute homes without predatory practices which have 
historically typified the market, such as dealer kickbacks and 
referral fees, agreements between lenders and dealers, sales-
price excesses, and so on. home-purchase financing repre-
sents another 
crucial step, 
and should be 
c onv e nt i on a l 
residential fi-
nancing, not the subprime and other high interest loans that 
currently compose two-thirds of the market. Manufactured 
homeowners have long been categorized as “subprime” be-
cause of their housing choice, not because of their credit qual-
ity. The new hampshire Community loan Fund, however, 
has demonstrated the viability of standardized home mort-
gage loans to these residents and paved the way for traditional 
banks to increasingly serve this market.
ROC USA Capital
to carry out RoC USa’s national mission, a specialized fi-
nancing entity must play a role. RoC USa Capital, a subsid-
iary of RoC USa with additional outside preferred share-
holders, provides affordable loans to resident-owned entities 
or cooperatives formed by homeowners in manufactured 
home communities. These groups are seeking financing to 
acquire or improve the land where their homes sit. RoC USa 
Capital’s goals are to:









The strategy to change the manufactured home market 
will be three-pronged, covering training and technical 
assistance, financing, and public policy advocacy.
Manufactured homeowners have long been catego-
rized as “subprime” because of their housing choice, not 
because of their credit quality.
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The last three goals are closely related. to obtain the lend-
ing capacity needed to operate nationally at scale, RoC USa 
Capital must sell or finance a significant portion of its loan 
portfolio position. numerous strategies exist with various 
loan channels to execute the strategy. 
Conclusion
RoC USa is a social enterprise focused on a specific market 
segment in need of specific resources and expertise to deliver 
better benefits to low-income homeowners. It enters the mar-
ket after 24 years of market testing in new hampshire, with 
market position and intellectual property. It has leveraged the 
investment of powerful members and supporters, capitalized 
its financing facility with equity and established exit channels, 
and organized nine existing nonprofit organizations as local 
technical assistance providers. RoC USa represents a nation-
al scale strategy in community economic development that is 
seeking to fulfill its mission of making resident ownership a 
reality nationwide.
1 S. Ward, C. French, and K. Giraud. (2006) Building Value and Security 
for Homeowners in “Mobile Home Parks:” A Report on Economic Out-
comes (Durham, NH: Carsey Institute, University of New Hampshire), 
available at http://www.rocusa.org/3B1_carsey_report_3C7A.pdf.
Certified Technical Assistance Providers
CASA of Oregon, newberg, oregon. Market area: oregon
Community Resources Group, Fayetteville, arkansas. Market 
areas: arkansas, texas, tennessee, Mississippi, louisiana, okla-
homa
Crossroads Urban Center / Utah Resident Owned Communi-
ties (UROC), Salt lake City, Utah. Market area: Utah
New Hampshire Community Loan Fund, Concord, new 
hampshire. Market area: new hampshire
Northcountry Cooperative Foundation, Minneapolis, Min-
nesota. Market areas: Minnesota, north Dakota, South Dakota, 
wisconsin, and Iowa 
NeighborWorks Montana, Great Falls, Montana. Market area: 
Montana
Real Estate Advisory and Development Services, Inc. 
(READS), Metuchen, new Jersey. Market area: new Jersey
Rural Community Assistance Corporation, west Sacramento, 
California. Market areas: alaska, arizona, California, Colorado, 
Idaho, Montana, new Mexico, nevada, oregon, Utah, washing-
ton, wyoming 
Rural Opportunities, Inc. (ROI), Rochester, new York. Market 
areas: new York, ohio, Pennsylvania 
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Michael Swack is a professor at The University of new 
hampshire, where he holds appointments at The Carsey In-
stitute and The whittemore School of Business and econom-
ics. he has more than 25 years experience in the fields of com-
munity economic development, microfinance, development 
finance and development banking. Swack’s current projects 
at Unh are in the area of community development finance, 
including projects looking at mechanisms to take community 
economic development to scale, new financial innovations for 
the field, and research on mission related investment by foun-
dations and other nonprofits. 
Swack was the founder and former dean of the School 
of Community Economic Development at Southern New 
Hampshire University. He has been involved in the design, 
implementation and management of a number of community 
development lending and investment institutions both inside 
and outside the United States. He was the first chairman and 
served for 17 years as a board member of the New Hamp-
shire Community Development Finance Authority, a state-
chartered equity fund for community economic development 
ventures and projects. He is the founding president and a 
current board member of the New Hampshire Community 
Loan Fund. He was a founding board member of the National 
Association of Community Development Loan Funds (now 
the Opportunity Finance Network), a trade association of 
Community Development Finance Institutions, and a current 
member of the Community Development Advisory Council 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Internationally he 
has been involved in microfinance and development finance 
work in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
Swack has published in the areas of community economic 
development and development finance. He received his doc-
torate from Columbia University, his master’s degree from 
Harvard University and his bachelor’s degree from the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison. He can be reached at michael.
swack@unh.edu.
NoÉmi Giszpenc is a consultant in community and eco-
nomic development. She has worked as a research assistant at 
the world Bank in the office of the chief economist and has 
also worked to help managers expand employee participation 
as an editor at the Nonprofit Quarterly and also as a consul-
tant and principal at ownership associates, a small consult-
ing firm serving employee-owned companies throughout 
the United States and abroad. She has contributed as a writer 
and speaker to employee-ownership publications and events. 
She has an undergraduate degree from the Massachusetts 
Institute of technology and a master’s degree in Communi-
ty economic Development from Southern new hampshire 
University.
Paul Bradley is the founding president of RoC USa™, 
llC. Prior to his appointment at RoC USa, he served as vice 
president for the new hampshire Community loan Fund 
(nhClF), where he managed and grew the loan Fund’s 24-
year old Manufactured housing Park Program (MhPP) by 
expanding its cooperative development program and initiat-
ing single-family lending and new production. During his 
tenure, loan receivables increased from $3 million to $30 mil-
lion and the number of Resident owned Communities more 
than doubled from 40 to 82, increasing resident-ownership’s 
market share in nh to 19 percent. Single-family lending ex-
ceeded $10 million in three years and a major sector change 
objective was met: an unprecedented $10 million initiative 
by Fannie Mae to finance single-family homes in Resident 
owned Communities. Under his direction, the MhPP devel-
oped the nation’s first manufactured home community con-
sisting entirely of energyStar® rated manufactured homes.
In 2004, Bradley initiated a national training program for 
nonprofit organizations that were interested in developing 
resident-ownership programs outside of new hampshire. 
It was the success of this program, known as The Meredith 
Institute, that led the Ford Foundation to provide planning 
support for the development of RoC USa. RoC USa was 
launched in May, 2008.
Bradley, a native of new hampshire, received his bache-
lor’s degree in economics in 1986 from the University of new 
hampshire. In 2008, he graduated from the neighborworks® 
america achieving excellence Program, an executive train-
ing program offered through harvard University’s kennedy 
School of Government. 
Wayne A. Marsden with 30 years of experience in credit-
related insurance, banking and business development, Mars-
den, since 2002, has been assisting the community economic 
development and affordable housing sectors in accessing the 
capital (debt) markets. he is currently actively engaged in 
raising the required equity capital necessary for Community 
Development assurance (CDa) to begin operations. 
he was a co-founder and the senior business development 
and marketing officer of aCa, the first domestic “a” rated fi-
nancial guaranty insurance company. Under his supervision, 
aCa became the most successful start-up company in the 




and planning positions at the following financial guaranty 
insurance companies (all were rated “aaa” at the time): am-
bac Indemnity, Capital Guaranty and College Construction 
loan Insurance association (“Connie lee”). Marsden was the 
corporate money manager and then national Coordinator of 
the Financial Services Division of Johnson & higgins, a lead-
ing international insurance intermediary. he also served as 
a corporate lending officer and cash management consultant 
for Manufacturers hanover trust (now J.P. Morgan Chase). 
Marsden is an active board member and volunteer for several 
not-for-profit organizations in the washington area. he cur-
rently serves as Chairman of Mercy health Clinic, a nation-
ally recognized free healthcare provider, serving uninsured, 
low income patients. For more information, contact wayne 
a. Marsden, President, Community Development assurance, 
1720 n Street, n.w., washington D.C. 20036 (202) 375-7765 
wamarsden@verizon.net 
Charles Tansey is the Senior advisor for the neighbor-
hood Reinvestment Corporation’s national Programs, Initia-
tives and Research Department in washington. From 1974 to 
1988, Mr. tansey engaged in corporate banking and corpo-
rate finance at the Chase Manhattan Bank, the Bank of new 
York, and Commonwealth Capital Partners. Since entering 
the community development field in 1988, he has served as 
the Interim executive Director of both the Minority Invest-
ment Development Corporation (RI) and the Rhode Island 
Coalition for Minority Investment. During the recession of 
1991-2, Mr. tansey helped set up and manage the $1.3 bil-
lion bailout agency for the privately insured banks and credit 
unions in the state of Rhode Island.  
During the Clinton administration, he served as associate 
Deputy administrator for Capital access at the SBa, man-
aging the $50 billion in assets of the 7(a), 504, Microloan, 
PRIMe, trade finance, and venture capital programs.  In addi-
tion, he co-chaired the Inter-agency work Group on Micro-
enterprise, and served as a member of the advisory Board 
of the CDFI Fund. Mr. tansey has had articles published in 
the Brookings Institution’s Capital Exchange, the Economic 
Development Quarterly, and a number of other publications. 
he has lectured at harvard’s kennedy School of Government, 
and is a member of the Financial Innovations Roundtable. he 
presently serves on the Board of Directors of Partners for the 
Common Good, is Chairman of the advisory Board for wall 
Street without walls, and is on the advisory Boards of the 
Center for Rural entrepreneurship and the national Founda-
tion for teaching entrepreneurship.  
About the Carsey Institute
The Carsey Institute at the University of New Hampshire 
conducts research and analysis into the challenges 
facing families and communities in New Hampshire,  
New England, and the nation.
The Carsey Institute sponsors independent, inter- 
disciplinary research that documents trends and 
conditions in America, providing valuable information  
and analysis to policy makers, practitioners, the media,  
and the general public.
Through this work, the Carsey Institute contributes to  
public dialogue on policies that encourage social mobility 
and sustain healthy, equitable communities and strength-
ens nonprofits working to improve family and community  
well-being.
The Carsey Institute was established in May 2002 with a 
generous gift from alumna and noted television producer 
Marcy Carsey.
Building knowledge for 
Families and Communities
Carsey Institute 
University of new hampshire 
huddleston hall
73 Main Street
Durham, new hampshire 
03824-3563
(603) 862-2821
www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu
